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The field of conflict resolution has received more attention after the fall of the 
iron curtain and the end of the bipolar division. The study of mediation is one of the 
major themes of the field. The current world suffers from many conflicts to which 
mediation could be a potential solution. Academie interest in the subject of mediation 
has the potency to attract the professionals dealing with resolving conflicts on the 
governmental and international level1. Hence it is important to look for new strategies 
and procedures in mediation. There are several definitions of mediation. The author 
uses the Bercovitch definition of mediation as: “A process of conflict management, 
related to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, whereby the disputing parties or 
their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help from an 
individual, group, statě or organlzation to change, affect or influence their perceptions 
or behavior, without resorting to physical force, or invoking the authority of the law2. 
Hopmann characterizes mediators as: “Third parties that are not direct participants in 
the negotiations, but whose role is to assist the conflicting parties to reach agreement 
in what otherwise basically remains a bilateral negotiation,”3 Fisher defines 
mediation as “a process of disentangling the parties from their separate positions and 
then leading them to commit themselves to a common position”4. The generál 
presumption is that the mediator should be neutrál and acceptable to both parties. 
Hopmann mentions Fisher’s opinion that the “ideál mediator is seen as a kind of 
eunuch from Mars who happens to be temporarily available"5. On the other hand 
impartiality is not always crucial for successful mediation. For instance, the United 
States of America has been engaged in facilitating the peace talks between Israel 
and Palestině despite the nation’s eminent relations with the Jewish statě. “More 
important are considerations of the possible consequences of acceptance or 
rejection on the ultimate terms of an agreement and on relations with the would-be
1 Bloomfleld and Moulton classiťy finding new strategies that would be useful in the reality of world affairs as a 
“daunting task'\ Bloomfleld, L.P., Moulton, A. (1997): Managing international conflict: from theory to policy: a 
teaching tool using CASCON. St. Martúťs Press, New York.
2 Bercovitch,J. The structure and diversity o f mediation in international relations, in: Bercovitch, J., Rubin, J., 
ed. (1992): Mediation in international relations: multiple approaches to conflict management. St.Martin’s Press, 
New York, p. 1-29.
J Hopmann, P.T. (1996): The negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts. University of 
South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, p. 221.
4 Fisher, R. (1978): International mediation: a working guide -  ideas for the practitioner. International Peace 
Academy, The United Nations, New York, p. 104.
5 Hopmann, p. 223.
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mediator." and “Successful mediation is achieved not so much by the mediatoťs 
objectivity but, rather, by the interests and capabilities of all participants, the mediator 
included’6.
1.1 Mediators
Speaking of mediation it is essential to point out the role of international 
governmental organizations, especially the United Nations. Given the UN’s status, its 
mediation efforts are supported by the entire international community of the States 
gathered under the banner of the organization. The UN has a speciál position among 
other organizations for its wide range of member States. Mediation is in a way one of 
the originál missions of he UN (UN Charter, Article 33). The fórum of the States 
should háve provided ground for discussions to prevent any possible escalation of 
conflicts. The other international organizations, which occasionally engage in 
mediation, are various regional organizations such as the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of Afričan Unity (OAU), 
Organization of American States (OAS), and Arab League. Mediation is often 
practiced among their member States. On the other hand every international 
governmental organization is still more or less dependent on its member States and 
their willingness to engage in any mediation action.
Apart from organizations, some respected individuals play the intermediary 
role. The UN secretary generál is often asked to participate in meditation because of 
his neutrality based on his representation of the majority. In other cases, the 
mediators are experienced politicians who are backed by their countries. There are 
three kinds of such personál involvement - individuals coming from strong countries 
(i.e. US Senátor George Mitchell facilitating peace negotiations in the Northern 
Ireland in 1998) who are in most cases subsidizing participation of their governments 
and individuals coming from neutrál countries (i.e. Count Folke Bernadotte, Gunnar 
Jarring, Swedes, assisting with resolving the Arab-lsraeli disputes) who are easily
6 Touval, S.; Zartman, W., ed. (1985): International mediation in theory and practice. The John Hopkins Foreign 
Policy Institute, Westview Press, lne., Boulder, Colorado, p. 15.
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perceived as mediators not representing interests of any tendencies in the worlďs 
politics. The third type is a person whose position guarantees a certain approach and 
adherence to definite values. For instance, the countries with majority of the Roman 
Catholic believers may seek the pope as an intermediary for his impartially and 
authority in the Catholic world. For instance the pope John Paul II was selected as a 
mediator in the Argentina-Chile conflict over islands located in the Beagle Channel.
Despite the efforts by international organizations and respected individuals, 
most mediation activity is carried out by nation States. There are two kinds of States 
in mediations -  smáli (weak) States and great powers. The identification is based on 
their influence on international politics. The smáli statě does not háve to be 
necessary less successful than the great powers. Some disputants may prefer a 
mediator that has no strategie interests in their region or in the field of dispute. 
Alternatively, great powers háve resources and influence to ‘push’ disputants to a 
decision or hold them in a stalemate, prepared to intervene if one side does not 
observe the results of negotiations. In the čase of Sri Lanka, there were three kinds 
of statě mediators: India (regional power), Norway (smáli statě), and Japan (leading 
economic power) hence the characteristics of statě mediator are further discussed in 
the chapter dealing with mediators in Sri Lanka.
While dealing with mediation and its actors it is necessary to explain the 
reasons why various international actors play the role of intermediary. Their motives 
are not purely generously humanitarian or altruistic. Touval and Zartman7 identity the 
causes of such involvement. Firstly, a mediator can be motivated by protecting its 
own interests or position which could be hurt by a negative outcome of the erisis. 
Secondly, the mediators may desire to extend their own influence. Touval and 
Zartmaďs classification was presented in 1985, at which point the field of 
international mediation was paralyzed by the Cold War. Currently, some countries 
engaged in mediation process want to enhance their international prestige and 
recognition.
7 Touval, Zartman, p. 11 - 13.
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There are many ways a mediator can approach the process of mediation. In 
this work one particular proceduře from the area of fair division is being applied. The 
distinguished experts in mediation, Touval and Zartman recognize several methods 
of mediation -  (1) the mediator transforms the bargaining structure from a dyad into a 
triangle -  meaning that the mediator is focused on keeping the triangular structure 
ratherthan a dyad since it holds parties in a mutual statement and the potential of the 
mediator joining one or another in a coalition against the other prevents them from 
any uncooperative action. Mediator as communicator (2) functions as a facilitator of 
communication delivering messages, redefining the issues of conflict, etc. Mediator 
as a formulator (3) “helps the two parties help themselves, by tactful, systematic, 
accurate, straightforward prodding and suggestion”8 9. Mediator as a manipulátor (4) 
posses resources of power, influence, and can make the parties act in a certain way 
by using all those tools to create a pressure. There exist more classifications of the 
methods of mediation, however the above schéma is the most relevant and complex.
1.2 Arbitration
In exploring mediation, it is vital to distinguish “arbitration” from mediation. 
Those terms are sometimes misinterpreted and interchanged. The author would like 
to clearly statě that the proceduře being discussed in this work is one of mediation 
not one of arbitration. Touval and Zartman define arbitration as an activity “which 
involves judicial proceduře and results in a verdict the parties háve committed 
themselves to accepťs. Alternatively, mediation is a process which does not háve to 
necessarily lead to a conclusion. The third party simply assists with finding modes of 
communication between the parties of the dispute and tries to prevent any potential 
misunderstanding. If the disputants do not reach any solution the mediator has no 
power to force them into any solution. Opposite to arbitration, the mediator has no 
power whatsoever if the disputants do not observe the reached resolution. Finally; 
mediation is not identical with peacemaking. Peacemaking involves using force by 
the third party while mediation should be left exclusively at the diplomatic level.
8 Touval, Zartman, p. 12.




This works analyzes the conflict in Sri Lanka and applies an innovative 
proceduře -  Adjusted Winner10 -  to it. The author chose Sri Lanka for its seemingly 
clear division of the parties involved in the disputes. There are two parties involved in 
the conflict, however at a second glance there are evident cleavages among different 
cliques within the Tamil and the Sinhalese groups11. The author is aware of these 
existing divisions and tendencies and the fact that it can negatively affect the 
application of the Adjusted Winner proceduře. Particular emphasis will be given to 
correlation of the disunity of the actors and the potency of the usefulness of Adjusted 
Winner to the conflict in Sri Lanka.
Secondly because the conflict in Sri Lanka lacks the involvement of world 
powers and is not connected to any of the current major issues (i.e. the clash of the 
western world represented by the United States of America and the Islamic 
fundamentalism represented by radical Muslim groups). Hence, it seemed to be an 
ideál conflict, free of any external influence, to apply the new proceduře. Thirdly, the 
author sought a conflict where the sides had previously expressed their willingness to 
terminate the dispute and háve already engaged in mediation. The Indián 
involvement as an intermediary did not meet with success nevertheless the 
Norwegian peace talks facilitation resumed in truce and signing the Memorandum of 
Understanding in February 2002. Seeing the potency for terminating the ongoing 
conflict the author chose the Sri Lankan čase for the purposes of the Adjusted 
Winner application. The tsunami disaster from December 2005 proved the 
relevance of finding lasting solution to the conflict. The Tamil inhabited areas in the 
East and North of the island were one of the most affected areas. The ongoing 
(malice) between the Sinhalese and the Tamil ethnic groups aggravated distributing 
the humanitarian aid and immediate reconstruction of destroyed regions. The 
Government of Sri Lanka prohibited the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan from 
visiting the LTTE12 controlled territory in the Northeast13. Secondly, the tsunami
10 To Adjusted Winner will be referred as to AW or the AW proceduře.
11 The problém is discussed in detail in chapter 4 dealing with the history of the conflict and the part introducing 
the Tamil player before the application of Adjusted Winner.
12 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, hereafter referred to as the LTTE.
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waves moved landmines remaining from the times of active fighting. Yet the 
landmines represent great danger for civilian population cooperation on their removal 
is not easy. The mediation attempts in the Sri Lankan conflict were not completely 
successful. The Norwegian initiative met with partial accomplishments (i.e. stop 
fighting after signing the Memorandum of Understanding in February 2002) however 
none of the ušed procedures was entirely successful.
The conflict in Sri Lanka is an internal conflict. The conflict is complex since it 
affects all aspects of everyday life (i.e. politics, economy, refugees, internal displaced 
persons). The resolution of this conflict has to go deeper than (simply) finding a 
political solution. Living environments háve to be created for all ethnic communities in 
Sri Lanka. The violent conflict has persisted since 1983; however the grudge and 
intolerance between the two largest communities, the Tamil and the Sinhalese, has 
been present since the mid 1950s when the ‘Sinhala only1 campaign was introduced. 
If the conflict is supposed to be resolved and terminated for good, the intolerance 
among the ethnic communities has to disappear. The conflict resolution cannot be 
limited only to finding a political solution. The main aim of this work is to find a 
mediation proceduře which has the potential to go beyond only finding the political 
resolution. The author presents the hypothesis that procedures dealing with different 
kinds of mediation (such as mediation of divorce settlements, business mediation, 
and mediation of labor relations) would affect different aspects of mediation in 
mediating political conflicts as well. While studying different procedures in business 
and labor mediation the author found the Adjusted Winner proceduře by Steven 
Brams13 4 of New York University and Alan Taylor of Union College. The proceduře 
provided a complex conflict resolution rubric. While applying the proceduře, all 
dimensions of the conflict were accounted. After meeting Steven Brams and 
discussing the potential usage of the AW proceduře to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka
13 When referring to the Northeast the author means the predominantly Tamil inhabited territory in the North and 
the East of the island; hereafter referred to as the Northeast.
14 Prior to the Adjusted Winner proceduře Brams was writing about the application of the game theory to the 
solving problems of political disputes. “His “theory o f moves” (1993,1 takés into account the tendency o f players 
to look ahead before making a move or decision. By doing so, the theory seems to capture several aspects o f 
actual strategie encounters between antagonists and allows for the possibility that players háve only incomplete 
Information. As such, Bram ’s theory assumes that players can rank outcomes in terms o f preferences but cannot 
necessarily attach Utilities to them, and allows for the use o f threats and eyeling o f moves to wear down an 
opponent”. Source: Druckman, D. Negotiating in the intemational context in Zartman, W ; Rasmunssen, J.L ed. 
(1997): Peacemaking in intemational conflict: methods & techniques. United States Institute of Peace Press, 
Washington D .C ..
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the author decided to use the AW proceduře for the purposes of her thesis. It seems 
more essential to provide a detailed illustration of one proceduře than to discuss 
more strategies in mediation without any depth. The proceduře is applied to the 
situation in Sri Lanka after signing the Memorandum of Understanding. The truce 
represented one of the lightest moments of the peace negotiation throughout the 
history of the entire conflict. If the AW proceduře would be applied to the conflict in 
Sri Lanka, it would be applied after February 2002 when the LTTE and the 
Government15 were most open to such negotiations.
1.4 Aims of this work
The aim of this work is to analýze the conflict in Sri Lanka, its roots, previous 
mediation efforts and most importantly to ascertain the possible usage of the 
Adjusted Winner proceduře in finding a lasting solution to the ongoing dispute. In 
order to demonstrate the AW application it is essential to explain the function of the 
method and briefly describe other fair division procedures. The hypothetical divorce 
settlement between Christina and George is ušed to better illustrate the proceduře 
and its possible alternatives (i.e. when both players assign the same value to an item, 
unequal entitlement) which will not appear in the AW application to the conflict in Sri 
Lanka, but which is essential to a better understanding of the proceduře. Adjusted 
Winner was chosen as a method which is being ušed in mediating interpersonal 
(divorce settlement, dividing share of an inheritance) and business disputes. 
Nevertheless it has to be affirmed at the beginning that it is not feasible within the 
framework of this thesis to present any generál statement regarding the possible 
usage of such procedures in mediation as the AW to political disputes. The author 
presented such aim in the project of the thesis, however at the time of writing the 
project she had very vague comprehension of the field of conflict resolution and 
mediation. After an independent summer research trip to the libraries of Columbia 
University (Lehman Sociál Science Library) and New York University (Bobst Library) 
in New York City, the author gained better understanding of the topič and narrowed 
the topič of the thesis to the application of the Adjusted Winner proceduře to the 
conflict in Sri Lanka.
15 One of the reasons was that the Government was led by the United National Party which is more open to 
concessions towards the Tamil.
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The core aims of this thesis are:
• To answer the question of whether the Adjusted Winner proceduře is 
applicable to the conflict in Sri Lanka.
• Whether any generál hypothesis can be made about applying the AW 
to political conflict.
• To what extent does the disunity of the players affect the outcome of 
the application, and if an application is even possible with such a 
condition.
• Whether it is sufficient to use only experts on Sri Lanka’s opinions to 
assign values to selected items or whether it is necessary to lead direct 
talks with the representatives of the parties involved in the dispute.
It is important to notice that the conflict in Sri Lanka is an internal conflict; 
taking plače within borders of one (still) unitary statě. When the author refers to the 
international conflicts (while explaining the application of the AW proceduře) the 
group includes the internal political conflicts as well. Kumar Rupensinghe in 
Resolving international conflicts: the theory and practice of mediation defines internal 
conflict as: “conflict taking plače primarily within the boarders of a given statě. Internal 
conflicts ofíen occur between statě and the civilian population. While the civilian 
population may or may not belong to an ethnic or minority group different from that of 
the dominant elite, these conflicts ofíen involve a notion of identity, a concept of 
security, and a feeling of well-being”16. Rupesinghe emphasizes the influence of 
“fragmentation of societies” and “communication breakdowns between segments of 
society” which was the čase of Sri Lanka. The Adjusted Winner proceduře has the 
potential to reduce the effect of those symptoms on the peace negotiations. The 
institutions and actors háve to transform during the process of the conflict resolution 
in order to adjust to a new environment. All these tendencies will be examined in this 
work. Speciál emphasis will be given to the adjustment of both actors of the conflict 
(Tamil and Sinhalese) to the peace process.
16 Bercovitch, J. ed: (1996): Resolving international conflicts: the theory and practice of mediation. Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, London, Rupesinghe, K. :Mediation in Internal Conflicts: Lessons ffom Sri Lanka, p. 156.
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2. Introduction to the Adiusted Winner proceduře
In this work AW’s possible usage will be examined for conflict between the 
Sinhalese government and the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. Due to the complexity of 
the conflict, it is essential to choose specific period to which application of AW will be 
demonstrated. The most opportune phase is the situation after signing the 
Memorandum of Understanding (sometimes referred to as the Ceasefire agreement) 
in February 2002. The AW proceduře will be applied to that time frame. One of the 
aims of this work is to establish whether this proceduře is applicable to the conflict in 
Sri Lanka and to explore the possible usage of the Adjusted Winner in the negotiation 
of political conflicts.
Looking for a new proceduře to mediate ethnic and religious conflicts every 
conflict is very unique in its nátuře, and the purpose of this work is not to over 
generalize but to look for a proceduře which would be applicable to numerous types 
of conflicts. The main idea of this work is to find procedures, which work well both for 
disputes of labor, divorce, and business and examine their possible usefulness for 
conflicts on the international level -  in this čase study to the Tamil -  Sinhalese 
conflict in Sri Lanka. The conflict will be structured, and points will be assigned 
according to parties’ preferences. In an ideál situation it would be possible to háve 
both sides meet and generate items and oversee point allocation. However, this is 
not possible and it is not necessary for the aim of this work. In other disputes such as 
divorces or a business dispute participants háve to distribute points themselves.
Mediator’s presence is very beneficial while he/she helps to find items, which 
will be negotiated and can assist both sides with allocations of points. The most 
significant problém in applying AW to international conflict is proving that all disputed 
items are wholly separable. Some items might be linked to each other and 
acceptance of one is conditional on the acceptance of another. This could jeopardize 
the whole proceduře of AW since division of points and goods would not be possible.
14
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The AW proceduře has never been applied to the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Nevertheless, many čase studies illustrating the method háve been carried out17. In a 
reál negotiation of International disputes the AW proceduře has never been ušed. 
Furthermore, AW has been wildly employed in divorce settlements and business 
disputes. New York University owns the patent to the Adjusted Winner and currently 
negotiates about its wider commercial use. According to Steven Brams, any company 
or individual can freely use the AW if not seeking personál profit.
2.1 Other fair division procedures
Before AW other procedures were employed to solve disputes when more 
than one item was being discussed. There were not as developed methods as AW 
and possessed some flaws (i.e. were not envy-free) since they mostly just divided 
goods into two equal parts but did not concern if the sides of disputes were satisfied 
with the value of the items they were given under other than AW proceduře.
Under strict alternation actors také turns in choosing from the list of items. It is not 
envy free proceduře since the side, which chooses the first is immensely advantaged 
while it can choose the most desired item.
The other method ušed for dividing articles is balanced alternation. Both sides 
make own list of items from the most desirable one to the least desirable one. If some 
items happen to be desired the same they are put into a contested pile. Goods in this 
pile are not divided under strict alternation but by taking turns. If actor A takés the first 
turn then the actor B takés the two next turns (A-B-B). This should compensate actor 
B for not taking the first turn from the contested pile.
The other proceduře applicable to solving disputes is divide and choose. One 
side divides all the items and the other side chooses which would she/he prefer. 
Divider has to make parts as equal as possible since he/she does not know which
17 Steve Brams and Alan Taylor conducted three main analyses applying the AW proceduře to: the conflict over 
the Spratly Islands, the Panama Canal Treaty from 1974, and the Camp David Accords from 1978. Tansa 
George Massoud from Bucknell University simulated the usage of A W to the finál solution of Izreli-Palestinian 
conflict in her article, Fair Division, Adjusted Winner Proceduře (A W), and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in 
the Journal of Conflict Resolution (Massoud, T.G. (2000): Fair Division, Adjusted Winner Proceduře (A W), and 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.44, No.3, June 2000, 333 -  358. Currently, 
Moshe Hirsh (Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) is applying the AW proceduře to the future 
negotiations over east Jerusalem. His work is still in progress, hence Hirsch requested not to be quoted yet.
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part will he/she receive. The problém with this proceduře is whether the diver has any 
information concerning preferences of the chooser. Supposing he had such 
knowledge he could make the division in his/her favor. If a basket of fruit (consisted 
of apples and oranges) were being divided the divider would split it in two halves with 
equal portion of apples and oranges. If the divider preferred apples to oranges 
he/she could make one pile just with apples and the other pile just with orange. 
Supposing the chooser picks oranges then the divider received 100% of his 
preferences. Divide and choose proceduře does not guarantee envy freeness or 
efficiency. Hence one cannot secure that the divider does not know the other side’s 
preferences this proceduře is not the most sufficient one.
3. Adiusted Winner
One of the most interesting tools for mediation on the international level is 
Steven Brams’ and Alan Taylor’18 method Adjusted Winner. This approach according 
to the author is applicable to any kind of conflict. The main idea is to také well- 
structured problém and help the parties obtain a fair settlement19. It is a means of 
dispute settlement; if ušed correctly20, both parties are winners. The author describes 
the proceduře:
“Under this proceduře, the two parties begin by independently (that is, 
secretly) distributing a total of 100 points across all the items to be divided, 
depending on the relative value they attach to them. Thus, if you consider a certain 
item to be worth one-fourth of the total value of everything to be divided, then you 
would put 25 points on it. ”21
The term winner represents the second part of the process. Each party 
temporally wins the items to which it assigns more points than the other party. In this 
step each player is given all the points for items, which they desire more than the
18 Steven Brams is a professor of political science at New York University in New York City.
19 Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.(1999): The win-win solution: guaranteeing fair shares to everybody. W.W. Norton 
& Company, lne., New York, Preface ix , .
20 It is unfeasible for the purposes of this work to interview the actors involved in the dispute. The preferences 
will be assigned after consultation with experts on the region (Jan Filipsky and Radek Novotný) and after 
studying materials and statements released by the disputants.
21 Brams, Taylor, p.l 1.
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other side. Supposing one side places 35 points on Muslim involvement in the 
negotiation process (i.e. the čase of Sri Lanka) and the opponent places just 30 
points on that item, the first side has temporally won that item.
The term adjusted explains why all the items are won only temporally. Once 
the points are distributed in the first part generally one party has more points than the 
other. The adjustment is necessary in order to achieve equitability (a.k.a. both parties 
háve the same amount of points at the end). The result of this adjustment is that at 
other the finál point redistribution both parties possess 50 or more of the total points 
of the settlement.
A clear way to demonstrate22 how this proceduře works is to apply it to a 
divorce settlement. It is a dispute of a different nátuře than the čase studies for this 
thesis; however, it will serve as a clear demonstration of the AW proceduře. In this 
hypothetical situation Christina and George are getting divorced and the following 






They are both given one hundred points and they must assign them according 
to their preferences. The items may appear indivisible, but anything can be divided 
under AW. Supposing that Christina and George had a child and its custody would 
be one of the items under dispute, it would be treated as any other kind of item (with 
parents sharing the custody of their child according to the results of finál point 
allocation). Dividing such an article in a strictly rational manner may seem 
extraordinary but the AW proceduře can be applied to conflict of any nátuře.
22 This method is a crucial proceduře for this thesis. It has never been applied to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The 




To begin applying AW to this example one must distribute the points 
according to party preferences. For this example we will suppose that George values 
City apartment more than Christina since iťs close to his Office and he does not háve 
time to arrange a new plače to live. For that reason he assigns nearly half of his 
points (45) to the apartment. Christina values Summer house more since she has 
more time to spend there. She also values Shares more (30 opposed to 20 from 
George) since her monthly salary is lower than George’s and she will need an extra 
financial asset. Trailer is the least desired item; Christina shows very little interest (5); 
George placed one tenth of his points (10) since he was positive that that would be 
enough to win this item23. Other includes the family car and a collection of wedding 
china. Christina assigned her points more evenly hence she had more extra points 
(15). George implied through the distribution of his points that he does not value any 
other items as much as he values the apartment.
Based on their preferences they allocated their hundred points in this way:
Item Christina George
City apartment 15 45





Christina temporarily won three items and George two. Her initial point total 
(the total value of the points she won -  35+30+15) is greater, 80, as opposed to 
George’s, 55 (45+10). Thus some points need to be transferred from Christina to
Predicting or guessing otheťs side point allocation can be to certain extension dangerous to the whole purpose 
of AW proceduře. “Manifestly, insincerity carries with it risk, in part because successful manipulation requires 
not only having a good idea ofyour opponenťs preferences -  and his or her sincere point assignments -  but also 
having some idea o f what his or her announcedpoint allocation will be. Without knowing the likely announced 
allocations, each party may end up being too clever by half -  that is, hurting itselfby being overly clever. 
Unquestionably, it is safer to be naivě or sincere, or almost so. Sincerity provides an absolute guarantee o f  
obtaining at least 50% o f the total value in one ’s own eyes, and possibly much more, as we will see in later 
examples. This makes sincerity a guarantee stratégy under A W: No matter what stratégy an opponent chooses, 
sincerity guarantees an envy-free portion to the sincere party. ” Brams, Taylor, p. 83.
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George. At this point both of them won the items they desired the most but they still 
would not be completely satisfied. George is envious because he knows that 
Christina is more satisfied with the results, since she received 25 more points than 
George.
In order to achieve equability the item with the smallest ratio will be the item 
that has to be divided between George and Christina. For Christina’s items24 being 
x and for George’s items25 being y, the fraction of Christina’s first item (Summer 
house) is 35/15 with the ratio 2.33; the second (Shares) 30/20 with ratio 1.5; and her 
last item (Other) 15/10 with ratio 1.5. The item Shares has the smallest ratio and in 
order to achieve equitability some these points must be transferred to George26.
Let p be the portion of Shares that will be transferred to George. We must 
solve the following equation for p.
80 - 30p = 55 + 20p 
p *  0.5
Since Shares is the item they value most similarly some points need to be 
transferred from Christina to George. P (0.5) will be ušed for this calculation.
Calculated point allocation:
Item Christina George
City apartment 0 45





24 The items Christina temporarily won.
25 The items George temporarily won.
26 Shares has more assets that be divided and thus it is preferred over Other.
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In total both parties must receive the same total number of points. Shares is 
the item that George desires the most from all the items Christina won. She still wins 
this item but she has to pay off George; he will receive 1/3 of its value27. After this 
point re-allocation both sides end up winning 65 points of 100 they had originally 
allocated. Since they both háve more then half and at the same time háve all the 
items they desire the most, they do not envy each other. This way, both parties feel 
like they received more than the other. Complete satisfaction on the both sides leads 
to the end of the conflict -  neither side feels like iťs necessary to continue 
negotiations.
Brams talks about four criteria, which are crucial for the satisfaction of both 
parties while settling a dispute. The first one is proportionality (1). Receiving a fair 
share is ensured by the finál reallocation of points, when both parties háve received 
the same total amount of points. Second, envy-freeness (2), both sides are satisfied 
that they received equal or greater portions of the items they desired the most. The 
fact that both parties feel that they received what they desired the most is a key 
element of AW.
According to Brams everything is divisible and that even seemingly indivisible 
values (like national rights) can be divided into portions28. It will be dosely examined 
in this work since most of the items of the conflict in Sri Lanka are of this nátuře. 
Equitability (3) means that both parties think that they received the same fraction of 
the total, as each of them values different items29. The last criterion is efficiency (4), 
which means that the achieved solution is the best possible outcome for both parties 
in the dispute.
27 She can either pay him off or suggest some other way of sharing the house (i.e. rules/schedule for George 
when he can use the house, etc.).
28 “Ifthe items being divided are not tangible property but more intangible issues, then before A W is applied, the 
parties should decide what each would obtain i f  it came out the winner on an issue. Only on the one issue on 
which an equitability adjustment must be made will a finer breakdown actually be necessary. Because this 
breakdown will be known only after A W is applied, the division on this issue must await the application o f A W. 
This is a situation in which a mediator couldplay a valuable role. He or she could telí the parties the split on 
this issue but not which party is the relative winner. Each party, not knowing whether it got the larger or the 
smaller percentage, would then be motivated to reach a fair-minded a g reem en tBrams, Taylor, p. 86.
29 Brams, Taylor, p. 14.
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3.1 Both plavers assiqn the same points to an item
If both players assign the same number of points to one item, the item wins 
the one who has less points (or the one who needs more points respecting the 
divorce settlement) in order to achieve equitability. Supposing if both Christina and 
George put the same amount of points on Shares, with point allocation:
Item Christina George
City apartment 15 45





Initially, Christina wins 80 points (35+25+20) and George 55 (45+10). Shares 
is assigned at first to Christina but it does not mean that she has won this item. Some 
points must be transferred from her to George in order to achieve equitability. Shares 
is the smallest ratio item (25/25 = 1) therefore the transfer process has to commence 
with that item. The items with the same points will always be the items with the 
smallest ratio hence if something has to be divided it has to be those items. The 
calculation is
80 -  25p = 55 + 25p 
p = 0.5
If the points for Shares are multiplied by 0.5 both Christina and George receive 12.5 





City apartment 0 45





3.2 One plaver is entitied to more than the other plaver, or he/she is stronqer
If one player is stronger30 than the other or is entitied to a larger ratio of the 
goods it has to be reflected in the finál adjustment. Leťs assume that George was 
the cause of divorce and therefore Christina is entitied to 3/5 of all the items. The 
ratio of their temporally won points is 80/55 (1.45)31. Christina should be given 3/5 
(1.5) of the divorce settlement. Hence some points from George háve to be 
transferred back to Christina32. Shares is the item with 1.5 ratio so a part of this item 
that George receives has to be given back to his soon to be former wife. George 
cannot get 10 points of Shares. If Christina wins Shares her points are up to 80 and 
George is left with 55 a ratio being 80/55 (1.45). Some points still need to be 
transferred to Christina since she is entitied to 3/5 of the settlement. The next item 
with the smallest ratio that George wins is Trailer. Thus some portion of Trailer has to 
be transfer to Christina so she can receive adequate portion of the divorce 
settlement. The portions comes from the equation:
80+ 5( 1- * )  _  ^
55+ 10*  2
30 For instance, if one side represents a larger population it could be entitied to a larger portion of goods in 
settlement.
31 Based on the first point allocation on page 13.
32 Based on the calculated point allocation on page 14. The results give both George and Christina the same. 




1/8 of Trailer needs to be transferred to Christina in order to fulfill her unequal 
entitlement to 3/5 of the divorce settlement. Christina values Trailer at 5 points 
therefore she gets 1/8 of 5 which is 0,625. It is important to think of the numbers not 
in a strictly mathematic way, because the AW proceduře is based on the preferences 
of the players. For George Trailer is worth 10 points but in Christina’s eyes it is worth 
only 5 points. Hence when the finál allocation is calculated it is based on the 
preferences rather than numbers.
The calculated point allocation:
Item Christina George
City apartment 0 45





At the end Christina has 80,625 points, which is 3/5 of the whole settlement. 
George won one whole item, City apartment, which is the item he preferred the most. 
He also received 7/8 of Trailer. (George valued Trailer tor 10 points; 10 less 1/8 is 
8,75. Christina valued Trailer tor 5 so her portion of the item is calculated from 5).
One could think that this is rather impossible to apply to political conflicts or to 
religious and ethnic disputes. Some items that are typically involved in disputes of 
this nátuře could appear indivisible. For instance, it may seem that simply splitting the 
items into half would diminish the whole purpose of the AW proceduře. On the other 
hand, by applying AW the chances that items háve to be divided into half are smaller. 
If there is one item which has the same amount of points from both parties, it does 
not necessary mean that both sides will share this item33.
33 The item may be given to the side that needs more points in order to achieve equitability.
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3.3 Flaws in AW
A possible flaw of this proceduře could appear if one or both parties knows the 
other’s preferences or tries to guess how many points the other side would assign to 
different items. Then they can purposely allocate fewer points to items that they are 
sure to win in order to savé points to win more items. Brams argues that this attitude 
only means harming your chance of successfully closing the settlement (getting 50 or 
more of your points). “Sincerity provides an absolute guarantee of obtaining at least 
50% of the total value in one’s own eyes, and possibly much more ...this makes 
sincerity a guarantee stratégy under AW: No matter what stratégy an opponent 
chooses, sincerity guarantees an envy-free portion to the sincere party.” 34
Another problém in whether AW is successful is the question of sincerity. Both 
sides háve to assign the points according to their true preferences. This is rather hard 
to prove (Its proof is beyond any exact science method.) and it has the potential to 
jeopardize the whole mediation under AW. On the other hand, with the mediator’s 
assistance this possibility should be completely eliminated. The mediator can assist 
choosing items in the dispute and lead negotiations concerning point allocation.
Looking at the AW application from a broader prospective it may seem that the 
application is irreversible and does not allow the sides to reconsider their point 
allocation. The authors of the proceduře count on the fact that the AW proceduře 
offers a finál solution which would make both sides satisfied without further intentions 
to continue in the negotiations or to change the results. It is perfectly understandable 
in a mathematic sense, where the constants of equations never change. In čase of 
political disputes it cannot be guaranteed that the players will remain invariable. 
Fisher in his work accentuates the significance of negotiation flexibility, “in analyzing 
any negotiation process, one of a mediatoťs key concerns should be the extent to 
which that process may be freezing the parties into negotiating postures or 
positions."35 *. Brams and Taylor view the Adjusted Winner application as a proceduře 
taking plače at a single moment in time. In the peace process in Sri Lanka the
j4 Brams, Taylor, p. 83.
35 Fisher, R. (1978): International mediation: a working guide, ideas for the practitioner. International Peace
Academy, the United Nations, New York, p. 103.
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positions of both sides on different issues háve developed over a long period of time 
(e.g. the Tigers adhered to the concept of the separate statě till November 2001). 
Nevertheless, the author sees the potential of the AW proceduře for resolving 
international conflicts36. The potential flaw could be that the mediation under the AW 
proceduře cannot be divided into several stages in which the players could adjust 
their positions and initial point allocation. When using the AW it is assumed that the 
actors will assign their points at certain time (it hasn’t been said explicitly, however it 
is presumed that it is a limited time period). Secondly, while applying the AW 
proceduře to a divorce settlement or a business dispute there usually is an arbiter 
who ensures that the finál settlement is followed. In the čase of an international or 
political dispute the lack of such an arbiter cannot guarantee adherence of the finál 
agreement based on the calculated point allocation of the AW. Consequently, 
governments, statě representatives, and negotiators frequently change their minds, 
which can affect the players’ preferences and values37. For that reason the 
settlement reached under the AW proceduře cannot be claimed to be definitivě.
4. Historv of the conflict in Sri Lanka
In order to better understand the nátuře of the čase study conflict for this work, 
it is necessary to explain the history of the disputes and its roots.
4.1 Division of political power after 1948
Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, became a British colony in 181538. The 
island officially gained independence39 in 1948 when the country became British
j6 Brams and Taylor discuss the potential use of AW for the dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China 
Sea. Brams, p. 125.
J? For instance, the two key Sinhalese parties -  United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) háve different perspectives on the conflict. While the UNP is willing to make more concessions towards 
the LTTE, the SLFP is considerably less tolerant. The point allocation for this AW application is based on 
Sinhalese preferences after signing the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002. Supposing there had been a SLFP 
led govemment, the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) point allocation would háve differed.
38 The ťirst European colonial power on the island was the Portuguese. They controlled the entire island except 
for the centrál highlands around Kandy. The kings of Kandy were able to thwart the Portuguese attempts to gain 
control over their territory. The Portuguese sought help from the Dutch who, in the end, became the new colonial 
power. As with the Portuguese. the Dutch were also not able to claim the highlands around Kandy. After 1796, 
the British supplemented the Dutch as the result of French revolution.
39 In 1947, the Soulbury Constitution laid out the framework for the new form of govemment in Ceylon. The 
country changed its name to Sri Lanka in 1972. Sinhalese háve always called the island Lanka; after an ancient
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dominium. Sri Lanka did not experience the same sort of national liberation uprising 
as India. The shifting of political power to the iocal elites (Sinhalese and Tamil40) was 
a slower process and was discussed only among educated English elites (both 
Sinhalese and Tamil). As a result of this independence process, the elites were 
expected to replace the British and become the new “rulers”. The founding 
constitution did not guarantee equality, national rights, or fundamental human 
rights41. The insufficient recognition of minorities42 and their basic political rights was 
a key factor leading to the future separatist war. The division of political power did not 
reflect the national division of the island. Any amendments added to the new 
constitution, or laws made against ethnic, religious, or racial discrimination required a 
two-thirds majority vote in the new parliament. Political parties presented this 
constitutional condition as an unsurpassable burden hindering the passing of 
important legislations. Although the two-thirds vote caused some problematic issues, 
the most převalení reason for the prolonged injustices was a lack of political will to 
solve the problems of ethnic division and to set up guidelines for successful 
Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim cohabitation. Another important issue was the question 
of religion. The first Sri Lankan Prime Minister D.S.Senanayake did not influence his 
politics with any religious prejudices. On the contrary, Senanayake did not háve any 
restraints in cooperating with the leader of the Tamil Congress, G.G. Ponnambalam. 
However, this situation changed after Senanayake’s death in 1952. Creating a policy 
of secularism, from the beginning, could háve saved the country from strict ethnic 
and religious (Sinhalese -  Buddhist, Tamil -  Hindu, Muslims43) divisions. At the root 
of conflict in Sri Lanka were other questions as well. These related to the official 
language, the systém of political parties, and the decentralization of the country’s 
political power.
tale taking plače on the island. The word “sri” means “auspicious” or “resplendent” in the Sinhalese language. 
Renaming the country in Sinha was one of the signs of Sinhala language dominance.
40 British colonists brought the Tamils to Sri Lanka from southem India to work as cheap labor on the tea, coffee 
and coconut plantations.
41 The Tamils and other minorities did not háve the same political rights as the Sinhalese. Laws were passed to 
restrict the amount of Tamil youth accepted by universities; the Government officially recognized neither the 
Tamil language nor their religion (Hinduism).
42 Tamils are the largest ethnic minority group (18%), the other ethnic minority groups are Moor (7%), Burgher, 
Malay, Vedda, (1 %). Source: www.countrywatch.com .
43 Sri Lanka is 7% of Muslims. The largest religious group is Buddhists (70%), the second are Hindu (15%), the 




After the disintegration of control by British, both the Sinhalese and the Tamil 
fought to replace English with their own language and cultural predominance. The 
majority of the ruling elites44 spoke English, and was educated in private Christian 
schools. The majority of people who could not pursue an English education were 
excluded from decision-making processes. Non-English speaking students could not 
pursue a university degree; this made the gap between the rich class and the rest of 
the country even more evident.
4.2.1 ‘Sinhala only’ campaiqn
Since there was no national liberation movement in Sri Lanka, the fight against 
the ruling wealthy elite in a way replaced the liberation movement for the country. For 
the Sinhalese, the only way to adjust the power differences between the elites and 
the Sinhalese majority was to replace English with Sinhala. Even though originally, 
after gaining the independence in 1948, the political leaders agreed to replace 
English with both Sinhala and Tamil. However, in 1955 the Sinhalese, námely the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), started the “Sinhala only” campaign in order to make 
Sinhala the sole official language for the country. The struggle against wealthy 
English speaking elites could also be viewed as a sociál class fight. Hence, the 
Marxist parties45 joined SLFP in the “Sinhala only" campaign. Sinhalese volunteers 
(i.e. teachers, Buddhist monks, and educated youth) led the campaign throughout the 
areas of Sri Lanka with a Sinhalese majority. The socio-economic aspects of the 
movement were also cogent since the campaign could háve easily been replaced 
with a struggle against the high privileged class. After the national election in 1956, 
the Sinhala movement gained its first success. The Ministry of Cultural affairs 
launched several programs to fund a number of Buddhist and Sinhalese protest 
proposals. Private schools were nationalized and Christian schooling was replaced 
with a Buddhist education. The recognition of Sinhala as the official language of Sri 
Lanka caused many difficulties for the Tamil minority. The Tamil speaking population
44 The English speaking elite represented about 6% of the Sri Lankan population. Source: Nubin, W: (2002): Sri 
Lanka: current issues and historical background. Nova Science Publishers, lne., New York, p. 62.
45 One reason why Marxists favored the Sinhala ethnic group over equality was the speciál relation between the 
Tamil minority and India. India was perceived as a threat to Sri Lankan independence.
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had no chance to learn Sinhala; without a knowledge of the official language, one 
could not seek employment in public Service positions. Events that started as an act 
of revolt against a wealthy English class eventually turned into an act that further 
discriminated the Tamils in the 1950’s. The situation improved in 1966 when the 
government introduced a regulation for implementation of the Tamil Language 
Speciál Act of 1958. Throughout the entire “Sinhala oniy” movement, a clear 
message was sent to the Tamil minority: a unitary rather than a federal approach was 
going to be pursued in Sri Lanka. This united the opposing Tamil population and 
provided one of the main causes of their national fight. The Official Language Act 
declaring both Sinhala and Tamil as the official languages of Sri Lanka was passed 
after signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. However, the problém did not 
seem to be solved even in 2003. In January, 2003, V. Anadasangari, a member of 
Parliament for the Tamil United Liberation Front, complained that government 
representatives sent letters to residents46 in North and East in Sinhala only47. The 
Norwegian government launched programs promoting the Tamil language throughout 
Sri Lanka and taught Tamil to the Buddhist monks, police personnel and 
schoolteachers. The language problém is rather sensitive and neglecting this topič 
can lead into even more serious ethnic clashes.
The only chance for an equal society would háve come from keeping religion 
out of politics, accepting both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages, and respecting 
the other minorities and their languages. They would háve had to build a new society 
on a human basis, not on ethnic and religion bases. In this way, Tamils would not feel 
the need to fight for their ethnic rights and would be able to accept the whole island 
of Sri Lanka as their homeland. A separatist war is not a surprising outcome from a 
society built on ethnic division and disrespect for minority rights. At this point, it is 
almost impossible to rewrite the Sri Lankan constitution from the scratch; the only 
solution is to start negotiations without any prejudices and with a will to compromise. 
This war has been on going for 21 years though, and it is a major obstacle in 
continuing and future development of the country.
46 Muslims living in the Northeast speak Tamil.
47 An article about this matter was published on the official website of the Government of Sri Lanka 
(www.priu.gov.lk) on January 29, 2003.
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4.3 Political parties and electoral riqhts
Since Sri Lanka did not go through a liberation anti-colonialist movement like 
other countries in the region; there was a lack of common political will to enforce a 
universal franchise. The ruling elites simply wanted to replace the British and 
eliminate the uneducated and poor majority from all decision-making processes. If 
this premise had won, the problems regarding the Tamil minority would not háve 
occurred because they never would háve experienced the minority status. Tamils 
made up a good half of the educated and wealthy elite. Only with a universal 
franchise did it become evident that Tamils were both a linguistic and territorial 
minority. Despite all the attempts against a universal franchise, it was introduced in 
1956. In a political sense, Tamils háve become the linguistic and territorial minority. 
Nothing was doně to create equal opportunities for all ethnic groups living in Sri 
Lanka. The Kandyan’s proposal for a federal systém at the Royal Commissions of 
1927 and 1947 was one solution for these issues; however, neither the Tamils nor 
the Sinhalese supported this proposal.
After gaining the independence in 1948, the country’s systém of political 
parties reflected their ethnic division as well. Parties were built on an ethnic instead of 
an ideological base48. The Multiethnic Ceylon National Congress transformed into 
the United National Party (UNP) with only the Sinhalese at authoritative positions. 
None of the other parties (Sri Lanka Freedom Party - SLFP, the Marxist party (JVC) 
had any Tamil representation in high rankings. On the other hand, there were only 
Tamil parties (TULF -  Tamil United Liberation Front, PLOTE -  The People’s 
Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) defending the Tamil interests. In 1978, the 
govemment changed the constitution and established the Office of an Executive 
President. The purpose of this Office was to overcome the gap between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamil population. The President would be elected based on a 
popular vote that would represent all people of Sri Lanka with no regards to ethnic or
48 The only exceptions were the Marxists parties - the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist 
Party, which were not founded on the basis of ethnic and religious cleavage; however, both Marxist parties 
entered the coalition with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and supported its chauvinist policies by 
embracing ‘Sinhala Only’ policy. The radical Marxist group Janatha Vimukli Peramuna (JVP, People’s 
Liberation Front) based its anti Tamil policy on TamiPs close relation to India (through their common religion 
and language). India was perceived as a threat to the Marxist ideologies.
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linguistic backgrounds. This effort failed because the president could be elected 
without any votes from the minority groups.
4.4 Provincial Councils
The first attempt at answering the Tamils’ call for self-governance and 
independence came with the Bandaranayake -  Chelvanayakam pact of 195749. The 
government proposed establishing ‘Regional Councils’ with powers on regional 
development, education, land, health, water schemes, roads and colonization. The 
government proposal roused a new sense of Sinhala nationalism against recognizing 
Tamil rights for self-governance under the banner of the Regional Councils. The 
government yielded to the Sinhala pressure and abandoned the idea for a new 
regional establishment50. The Federal Party (FP) introduced a new proposal for 
decentralization after the election in 1960 and again in 1965. The latter attempt was 
successful and led to an agreement, The Dudly-Chelvanayakam pact. This pact 
established ‘District Councils’, and elected authorities with fewer powers51. Their 
resemblance to the ‘Regional Councils’ was only marginal since they represented 
smaller territorial units. The Sinhala national movement and other opposition groups 
were strictly against this and began a protest campaign. The government again gave 
in to the Sinhala pressures and abandoned the pian for decentralization a second 
time. The establishment of the Provincial Councils in 1988 was another attempt to 
solve the ethnic crises. The level of independence proposed was insufficient and did 
not establish the requested degree of self-determination and decentralization. The 
centrál government refused to share control over security and other important issues 
(taxes, local budgets) with the Provincial Councils. For the most part, finál control 
over the provinces would remain in the hands of the centrál government and the 
President. The President could appoint the provincial governors who, in turn, could 
then veto a law passed by the regional council. Through this systém of checks and
49 The pact between Sinhalese prime minister, SWRD Bandaranayake, and the Tamil leader, SJV 
Chelvanayakam, represented the first effort to accommodate some of the Tamil demands. The pact was 
abrogated within less than a year in April 1958, Bandra, p. 64.
50 The proposal to institute Tamil as the official language of Northern and Eastem provinces was rejected due to 




balances, the Provincial Councils would remain a second-class institution. Both Tamil 
and Muslim52 minority rejected this governmental proposal.
The idea of decentralization was presented in Sri Lanka during the 1940’s as 
an alternativě to a centralized colonial administrativě systém. After gaining 
independence in 1948 and after the beginning of the ‘Sinhalization’ of the 
government, the separation was seen as a concession to the Tamil minority. Failing 
to solve the issues of decentralization was one of the major reasons leading the 
Tamils to protest for a separate statě instead of finding a solution for regional self- 
governance within the Sri Lankan statě.
5. Peace talks
5.1 The first peace talks in Sri Lanka 1985 -  1989
The first peace talks53 began in 1985, two years after the beginning of the 
conflict. Tamils were represented by an umbrella organization, Eelam National 
Liberation Front (ENLF)54, and by two organizations outside of ENLF, The People’s 
Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF). As a solution to growing ethnic crisis, the Tamil delegates held four 
main principles: the “Thimphu principles". These principles are the cornerstone of the 
Tamil struggle for their rights. They included: recognition of Tamils as a separate 
nationality; recognition of the traditional homeland of the Tamils and guarantee of its 
territorial integrity; recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination; 
conferment of citizenship on all Tamils who looked upon the island as their country55. 
The Thimphu principles determined the direction of the TamiTs struggle. The 
Sinhalese government did not accept any of these principles. In the end, the first 
peace talks served as an exchange of information more than anything else -  both
52 The Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC), which had 11 members in parliament, withdrew from the PA led 
government coalition as a protest to uniting the Muslim dominated province Kalmunai with the Tamil East 
province under the banner of the Provisional Councils. The last straw was the removal of the SLMC leader, Rauf 
Hakeem, from government (he was the minister of trade).
53 The negotiation took plače in Thimphu, Bhutan.
54 ENLF included three military organizations: The Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), 
The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TĚLO), and The Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students 
(EROS).
55 Flerath, R. B. (2002): Sri Lankan ethnic crisis: towards a resolution. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, p. 61.
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sides learned about each otheťs positions. Sri Lankan President Jayewardane 
proposed a second peace talk which was held in Banglore, India in 1986 under the 
cover of the Summit of the South Asian Area for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). 
President Jayewardane introduced the “Trifurcation Proposať, a proposal that did not 
deal with the Tamil ethnic crisis directly. The pian called for: (1) the separation of the 
Amparai District from the Eastern province since the majority in the Amparai District 
were not Tamils and the Eastern province was mainly Tamil area, (2) the creation of 
the Provincial Council for the Eastern province, and (3) the separation of the Northern 
province, as it was before. The proposal did not address any of the minority rights 
issues only the administrativě division of the island. The Tamils could not accept this 
offer and end the separatist war. The government underestimated the ethnic problém 
and did not plače enough focus on solving the political differences between the 
Tamils and Sinhalese. The situation worsened as the government launched its 
“Operation Liberation” to fight against the Tamil forces (LTTE)56. The peace talks 
were impossible to continue under the given circumstances. India supported the 
Tamils by providing food and other essential supplies. Such involvement aggravated 
lndia’s later position as the first mediator in future peace talks.
In July 1987, the Sri Lankan government decided to allow temporal unification 
of the two Tamil provinces -  the northern and eastern. The LTTE requested a 
withdrawal of the Sri Lankan government troops and an allowance for the return and 
resettlement of all the Tamil refugees before peace talks could be renewed. At the 
same time, the LTTE announced that both disarmament and referendum on the 
Eastern province alone would not be acceptable as pre-negotiation conditions.
On July 29, 1987, India stepped in and signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement 
to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka agreed to recall the 
government troops from Northern and Eastern provinces and replace them with the 
Indián Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The Indián forces were there to protéct the
56 Tamils were not afraid to use any means while waging the guerrilla war. In 1985, Tamil fighters shot and 
killed 146 Buddhist worshippers at Anuradhapura. They were the first to use suicide bombing (July 1987). The 
greatest concem of the intemational community arose from the fact that the LTTE guerrilla army recruited 
children and women to serve in their forces. LTTE declared that it would stop sending children to fight; 
however, it did not honor this commitment. www.countrywatch.com, Sri Lanka, Political Conditions, page 5.
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guerrilla fighters white they laid down their arms. As Howard Wriggins57 mentions, the 
Tamil negotiators did not possess complete support of the entire Tamil representation 
-  especially of the most militant fraction. As a consequence, the guerrilla movement 
turned on the Indián peacekeepers and the conflict resumed58. Allowing India to 
assist in ending the civil war was unwise because the Sinhalese majority did not 
perceive India as trustful. As Sri Lanka’s neighbor, with a Hindu population of 80%59, 
India has a great interest in the situation of the Tamil minority. India did not prove to 
be a good impartial mediator; hence, in the future, other countries60 with no previous 
particular relations with either the Tamil or the Sinhalese were chosen for 
negotiations.
5.2 The end of the IPKF’s mission
Although the government expressed some efforts to solve the conflict by 
proposing partial decentralization through setting up Provincial Councils, the LTTE 
refused to accept this offer and did not surrender their weapons. In 1989, the newly 
elected President, Premadasa from UNP61, replaced President Jayewardane. The 
new President opposed Indián involvement in the conflict and in May 1989, he began 
new negotiations with the LTTE without Indián assistance. Both sides agreed that 
withdrawing the IPKF would be beneficial for the whole country. During this time, the 
Government was secretly providing the LTTE with money and weapons to fight the 
Indián troops. In February 1990, President Premadasa officially asked the IPKF to 
leave Sri Lanka. LTTE presented two demands to be negotiated: (1) the dissolution 
of the North East Provincial Council and (2) the repeal ofthe Sixth Amendment ofthe 
Constitution. The government did not accommodate those demands and in June 
1990, LTTE stepped away from the negotiations. This set of peace talks was not very 
successful; however, both the Government and the LTTE proved that they were able 
to enter into negotiations and make some convergences and concessions.
57 Wrriggins, H.: Sri Lanka: negotiations in a secessionist conflict. In: Zartman, W. ed., (1995): Elusive Peace: 
negotiating an end to civil wars. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D .C ..
58 Wrriggins, p. 35.
59 Surce: www.countrywatch.com .
60 The Norwegian and Japanese engagement in the conflict as mediator is discussed in details in the chapter 4.
61 LTNP, United National Party .
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The Tamils continued to fight in the separatist war. The most significant 
actions by LTTE were the assassinations of the Indián Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, 
in 1991 by a suicide bombing, and the Sri Lankan President Premadasa in 1993.
5.3 People’s Alliance’s peace initiatives
The generál approach to the ethnic conflict changed in 1994, the year of the 
parliamentarian elections. The People’s Alliance (PA) entered the campaign with 
certain knowledge that the separatist war must be ended through new negotiations. 
PA won the election and Chandrika Kumaratunge62 became the new prime minister. 
On October 13, 1994, a new round of negotiations with the LTTE began but 
negotiation did not meet with success and failed after six months. The Government 
insisted that all the issues should be discussed at the same time, whereas LTTE 
preferred to separate talks concerning the renewal of peace and a peaceful political 
situation. After the negotiations failed, LTTE resumed the war by bombing two navy 
boats on April 19, 1995. The government sought national and international support to 
fight the terrorism led by LTTE. An important turning point came on December 2, 
1995 when the Sri Lankan army captured Jaffna, the main stronghold of the LTTE63. 
LTTE responded with several attacks on the government and commercial Sinhalese 
buildings. Also, in May 1998, the mayor of Jaffna was assassinated64. Conditions for 
peace talks revitalization proved to be quite poor as both sides showed no effort 
whatsoever to stop fighting and revise their positions. Another significant turn in the 
situation came on September 6, 1998 when LTTE announced their willingness to 
continue in peace talks under one condition -  mediation conducted by a third party. 
The Government rejected the offer and LTTE continued in their attacks on the 
Sinhalese public figures. On December 18, 1999, President Kumaratunge and the
62 Kumaratunge’s parents S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike were both Sri Lankan prime 
ministers. Kumaratunge was not a prime minister for a very long time, and she joined the presidential race just a 
few months later. When a suicide bomber killed her main opponent, Gamini Dissanayake, she won the 
presidential election. President Kumaratunge named her mother, Sirimavo, the next prime minister.
63 This action severely affected the people of Jaffna. Many of them had to flee the country and ended up in 
refugee camps. The Sri Lankan government started to censor the press on information about the fíghts in the 
Jaffna region. The government did not want news spread of some affairs, such as the corruption in the Sri 
Lankan army. Source: www.countrywatch.com.
64 LTTE ušed many of the same methods as other terrorist groups, attacking trains (on July 24, 1996 a bomb 
exploded in a commuter train in Colombo), business centers (Twin-Tower World Trade Center on October 15, 
1997, Maradana, March 5, 1998), religious symbols (Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, January 25, 1998, the most 




Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Presidenťs mother, survived a bombing 
attack. LTTE offered a truce again on May 8, 2000, shortly after winning control over 
an important part of the Jaffna peninsula, the Elephant Pass. Determined to win the 
war through the military, the Government rejected the truce and peace negotiations. 
By now, the war had been continuing for 17 years and both sides were exhausted 
both militarily and economically. The situation in Sri Lanka did not change even after 
the parliament elections in October of 2000. Although the PA lost some mandates, 
they still won the majority vote forming coalition with some smáli Tamil and Muslim 
parties. Ratnasiri Wickramanayake of the PA became the new prime minister. The 
new govemment did not pian to enter any fresh peace talks.
5.4 Unilateral ceasefire
On November 2, 2000, the Norwegian diplomat Eric Solheim, announced that 
LTTE was willing to enter new peace talks without preconditions. This was a great 
break through because overcoming preconditions was a difficult burden in previous 
negotiations. The government rejected this offer. The main question was whether or 
not the Tamils would give up their request for a separate statě and would be willing to 
negotiate about the ievel of their political autonomy within the Sri Lankan statě. On 
December 24, 2000, LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire and called on the 
government to accept this and ceasefire as well, but the government refused.
The Governmenťs position was weakened by a withdrawal of the Muslim party 
-  The Sri Lankan Muslim Congress - due to the PA’s reluctance of administrativě 
separation of Kalmunai from the Eastern Province. Coalition led by the PA lost its 
majority in the Sri Lankan Parliament. President Kumaratunga saved the situation by 
signing an agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding65; the Marxist party was 
ultimately in opposition. However, none of this did anything to solve the unsettled 
situation in the Sri Lankan parliament. After a proposal of opposition, the United 
National Party with little confidence motioned to shift some key government members 
in the opposition. President Kumaratunga dissolved the parliament on October 10,
65 JVP signed the agreement with several conditions. President Kumaratunga had to reduce the size of her 
cabinet from 44 to 20. On September 24, 2001 the parliament passed the 17* Amendment to the Constitution 
appointing Constitutional Council and four independent commissions on elections, the judiciary, the police and 
public Service, Herath, p.67.
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2001. The UNP came out of these matters as the strongest party from the following 
parliament elections in December 2001. The New Prime Minister, Ranil 
Wickremesinghe of the UNP66, started a new era of cohabitation with President 
Kumaratunga of the PA. The new political situation brought change in the 
Government position towards the ongoing separatist war and the LTTE. The new 
prime minister called for international support in ending the war and for the renewal of 
the Norwegian present as the third party mediator. In return, the LTTE announced a 
month long ceasefire starting on December 24, 2001. This positive step forward was 
fallowed by the government, which fallowed LTTE and matched the ceasefire. 
Conditions for peace talks were better than they had ever been since the beginning 
of the conflict in 1983. Both parties reached a point when they realized that entering 
peace talks was beneficial even without a fulfillment of any preconditions. On January 
3, 2002 the Sri Lankan news website, Colombopage, released that the LTTE leader, 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, sent an official letter to the Norwegian67 prime minister, Kjell 
Magne Bondevik, to continue as the facilitator of conflicts. According to R. B. Herath 
(p.68) it was an important input from the LTTE since such a letter was the first in the 
history of the conflict. The first success was the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU, February 22, 2002) in which both sides agreed on an open- 
ended cease-fire. The peace effort, which started in 2002) is the sixth one in the 
history of the conflict. The LTTE felt very confident about their position and made a 
proposal for additional conditions under which LTTE would continue the actual peace 
talks. The conditions were: lifting the ban on the LTTE (In post September 11 issues, 
connected to terrorism that were regarded with immense sensibility, LTTE was put on 
a list of international terrorist groups in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, most 
countries including the US demonstrated that they would not negotiate with terrorists 
under any circumstances. The labeling of the LTTE as a terrorist group was a definite 
burden on the peace talks68.) The Sinhalese public was skeptical of the results of the 
peace talks as none of the talks beforehand were very efficient. Some news about 
LTTE recruitment and regrouping of Tamil military forces emerged in the Sri Lankan
66 The UNP formed a coalition with the help of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Ceylon 
Worker's Congress of the Indián Tamil (CWC). The official name of the coalition was The United National 
Front (UNF). The December 2001 elections brought up one curiosity -  the Buddhist monk, Baddegama Samitha, 
who was an MP but was elected for the PA in the Galle district, Herath, p.68.
67 More on Norway as a mediator (and its role) in the mediators’ section, chapter 6.
68 Herath mentions that apart from LTTE being viewed as a terrorist group, its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, 
was suspected of being involved in the assassination of the Indián Prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, Herath, p.69.
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press69. The GOSL70 and the LTTE met 6 times under Norwegian supervision. In 
špite of the fact that the initial negotiation process was lacking support of some key 
participants (i.e. president Kumaratunga had some major reprehensions against the 
content of the Ceasefire agreement), it succeeded in several ways. Firstly, it 
happened to be the longest period without direct fighting in the history of the war. The 
other great achievement was establishing sub-committees where representatives of 
both the LTTE and the GOSL were cooperating on addressing practical issues (such 
the humanitarian funds), hence working on practical issues was important in the 
transformation the LTTE into a legitimate political party. Japan joined Norway in 
facilitating the talks even though they focused more on the socio-economic aspects 
of the negotiations. Despite all the mediation attempts and some success, the peace 
process ended in April 2003 due to the continued violation of the Ceasefire 
agreement by the LTTE cadres and generál mistrust on both sides.
6. Mediators in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka
This work applies the Adjusted Winner proceduře to the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Its potential for resolving the conflict between the Sinhalese government and the 
Tamil minority represented by the LTTE is discussed. It is vital to mention the 
mediators assisting the two sides in negotiations throughout the history of the conflict. 
There are many theories dealing with the nátuře of the mediator and its 
characteristics. Mitchell mentions motives of the mediators when entering a conflict. 
According to Mitchell, the mediator side is not necessary neutrál. Just by taking an 
initiative and getting involved in the conflict is the third side expressing its opinion to 
terminate the dispute. The type of intermediary that intervenes can greatly influence 
the nátuře of negotiation. "The underlying motives from which an intermediary 
initiative arises and which sustain it are likely to háve a marked influence on the way 
that an intermediary conducts the process, on the manner in which the parties in 
conflict react to the intermediary’s activities and on the eventual outcome particularly
69 Herath, p. 70.
70 Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) hereafter referred to as the Government or GOSL.
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In terms of the form any finál settlement mlght take."7\  Furthermore, Mitchell 
presumes that the mediators do not always act in an altruistic manner. This theory is 
relevant to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The first intermediary, India, is a typical example 
of such behavior71 2.
In the conflict in Sri Lanka, there were three mediators. The first, India was the 
least successful one. Norway was the one who played the most vital role because it 
facilitated the peace negotiations that began in 1995. In order to present the whole 
picture of the conflict in Sri Lanka it is important to characterize the mediators (and 
their techniques). There are three types of mediator -  regional power (India), smáli 
statě with no šelf interest in the conflict itself or a strategie interest in the region 
(Norway), and leading economic power (Japan)73. It is remarkable how the three 
different types of mediators can influence the peace process.
6.1 Regional power -  India
India had several reasons to intervene in the conflict in neighboring country as 
a mediator. Apart of the geographical proximity and lndia’s geopolitical interests, 
India has a large Tamil population in Tamil Nadu74. The emancipation of the Sri 
Lankan Tamil could háve led to similar actions by the Tamil in India. The Indián 
government feared the spillover effect and the disability of the region. Alternatively, 
India was interested in playing the role of the regional hegemonie leader and keeping 
the West from intervening in the Indián subcontinent. Furthermore, the role of the 
Indián statě, Tamil Nadu, was rather unique since it influenced the Indián policy 
towards the Sri Lankan conflict. The Indián Tamils provided the Sri Lankan Tamil 
freedom fighters with sanctuaries, training, bases, arms, and occasionally with
71 Mitchell, C., R.: The Motives for Mediation in: Mitchell, C.,R.; Webb, K. ed. (1988): New approaches to 
intemational mediation. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, p. 30.
72 It has to be noted that the MitchelTs work was written in latě 1980s when the tradition of non-state mediators 
was not as strong as it is at the present. Intemational organizations such as the United Nations acted in the 
shadow of the Cold War. While talking about biased third parties, Mitchell principally means statě mediators.
7j However, the fact that Japan did not play the role of the typical mediator is important to include in this list. 
Japan has played a very important part in organizing the donor conference to help finance the reconstruction of 
the Northeast. It was an important aspect of the socio-economic side of the conflict.
4 The Tamil population in Indián statě, Tamil Nadu, sympathized with the Sri Lankan Tamil. From 1980 India 
provided arms and shelter to the LTTE. After the assistance stopped in 1987 the political parties in Tamil Nadu 
continued their support of the LTTE and other Tamil groups. Source: de Silva, K.M. (2001): Sri Lanka’s 
Prolonged Ethnic Conflict: Negotiating a Settlement. Intemational Negotiation 6/2001, 437-469, Kluwer Law 
Intemational, the Netherlands, p. 439.
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financial resources. Although the Indián government has never officially confirmed 
tolerating such activities in Tamil Nadu both prime ministers, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv 
Gandhi were aware of what was happening in the union statě Tamil Nadu75. The 
other important factor was the pressure from the Indián Tamils on the Indián 
government in the matter of the Sri Lanka crisis on behalf of the Tamil fighters. India 
assisted in arranging talks between the representatives of the GOSL and the LTTE. 
In 1985, India sponsored two rounds of talks in Thimpu, Bhutan. During the talks the 
Tamil officially formulated their claims in the Thimpu principles76. The Thimpu peace 
conference did not meet with success. After the Thimpu meeting other talks were 
held in Delhi, India on August 30, 1985. The results of this meeting were the bases 
for later Indo-Lankan accords in 1987.
Indián involvement can be divided into two phases. The first phase ended in 
July 1987 when India finished its diplomatic engagement77 in the conflict in Sri Lanka 
and chose a different, military, approach. At the end of the diplomatic negotiations 
the Indo-Lanka accords were signed. On the basis on these accords India committed 
to send a peacekeeping mission to Sri Lanka. The role of changed from one mediator 
to one as active participant. The Indián Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) arrived to the 
island after signing the accords on July 29, 1987. At that time the unit consisted of 
around 5,000 men. At the end of the IPKF’s operation in Sri Lanka there were around 
100,000 men in the unit78. The initial task of the Indián peacekeepers was to monitor 
the situation between the Tamil and the GOSL army forces. The peacekeeping 
mission was not met with the local support. The Sinhalese majority accused the 
peacekeeping troops of being impartial and secretly supporting the LTTE fighters. 
According to Bercovitch, mediation is in its nátuře “a non-coercive, non-violent and 
ultimately non-biding form of intervention" 79. The Indián involvement in Sri Lanka
75 Source: de Silva, p. 454.
76 The Thimpu principles are described in the chapter on the history of the peace talks, page 26.
77 Rupesinghe characterizes this phase as “active diplomatic engagement through high-level political meetings, 
shuttle diplomacy, consultations with the main protagonists, and the establishment o f formal frameworks for  
negotiations” Rupesinghe, 159 It has to be mentioned that India was rightfully accused of being impartial.
During their diplomatic engagement in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, the Tamil LTTE cadres were armed and 
trained in Indián statě of Tamil Nadu (Rupesinghe, 159).
78 “At the height o f India ’s Sri Lankan operation, more than 120 000 o f its troops were in the country; 7000 were 
killed and many more woundeď  De Silva, M., and Cowper R. (1993): New Dehli Has Score to Settíe. Financial 
Times, October27 in: Rupesinghe, 159.
79 Jacob Bercovitch in Studies in International Mediation (Bercovitch, J„ ed. (2002): Studies in International 
Mediation. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 5).
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exceeded such criteria. In this čase India definitely acted more as an intervening 
nation than as a neutrál, impartial mediator. As de Silva mentions in his article, 
despite all assertions by president Jayewardene that the IPKF would be under his 
command, the peacekeeping force remained under the Indián governmenťs control. 
Paradoxically, the mission was fighting against the cadres that were once trained and 
armed in India. The second phase of the Indián involvement in the Sri Lankan peace 
process was the lowest point of mediation throughout the history of the conflict. In 
1988, the newly elected president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa, started 
negotiation with the Indián government about withdrawal of the peacekeeping troops 
from Sri Lanka. The last Indián units left Sri Lanka in March 199080. The three year 
long presence of the IPKF immensely effected the Indián position in the peace 
process. India proved to be an unsuitable mediator which served its own interests 
before those of the parties involved in the dispute. Despite India s aforementioned 
failure in the past lndia’s current proven inability to be beneficial to either side, 
President Kamaratunga does not discount the possibility of lndia’s assistance in the 
current ongoing peace process. In the interview for The Hindu81 she said: “In the finál 
count, India is the one country that would be justifiably interested in Sri Lanka. Sri 
Lanka’s future in this (peace) matter, for reasons that are known ... the historical 
reasons, the geographic proximity, the linkages, economic and everything else.’’ India 
as the regional power will be always interested in the political situation of its 
neighbors, however its credibility as the mediator in the peace process in Sri Lanka 
has been irrevocably tarnished by its military intervention in the latě 1980s.
6.2 Smáli (weak) statě mediator -  Norwav
Norway developed a good reputation as peace facilitator in 1993 while 
brokering the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation that lead to the Oslo Accords. 
Consequently, Norway assisted in various peace processes in Guatemala (1996),
80 The IPKF offered the Sri Lankan army to occupy the positions (camps and other army facilities) in the 
Northeast. According to de Silva (de Silva, p.457) the Sri Lankan army was “lulled into a falše sense o f  security 
by the cordiality o f the early talks between the government and the LTTE, the Sri Lankan troops did not move in; 
indeed even the large police force in parts o f the east were withdrawn. Thus the LTTE forces were permitted to 
establish themselves in the areas vacated by the IPKF.
81 The Hindu is one of the biggest national newspapers in India. The article with the interview with President 
Kamaratunga was published on the Government official website (www.priu.gov.lk) on April 12, 2003.
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Haiti, Sudan, Cyprus, Kosovo (1999), and Columbia (2000). As Bullion mentions in 
his article82, Norway is selective and occasionally refuses to assist in peace 
negotiation. “Sometimes people come to us afíer meeting a guerrilla leader in a bar 
who says he wants to make peace with the President,”83 84. Nevertheless, Norway has 
the best potential to become a leading mediation power in the world. With its non- 
existing ex-colonial and geostrategical interests, it has the best qualification to be 
impartial and suitable for various parties. Norway is the typical example of smáli 
(some publications use the term “wea/c”) statě mediator. Pruitt relates the character of 
mediator to the success in mediation. He explains the mediation power of ‘‘weak’ 
States like Norway. “The weak mediatoťs main tools are in the realm of 
communication and formulation rather than manipulation...They include the capacity 
to transmit and interpret messages, to bring realism into the parties’ conceptions of 
each other, to reframe the issues, and to make suggestions for settlement. When the 
motivation to settle is secure on both sides, weak mediators like Norway are often 
superior to strong mediators like the US, for several reasons: international reporters 
are less attentive to the weak than strong, making it easier for them to assure 
secrecy to the disputants; weak mediator are less often biased by their own interests; 
and disputants sometimes find it easier to agree to a weak mediator’s suggestions, 
because it is less likely to be viewed as giving in to superior power."84. Bullion adds 
that Norway hopes to enhance its standing at the United Nations (UN) and other fóra 
by establishing its role as a third-party mediator85. Consequently, Norway as a stable 
democratic country, is not likely to change its foreign policy in the event of a 
government change. Such a country can engage in long-term perspective peace 
negotiations without fearing its potential foreign policy modification. For instance in 
the middle of negotiations with the GOSL and the LTTE in 2000, the Norwegian 
Labor Party (Det norské arbeiderparti, DNA) won Norwegian parliamentary elections 
and the Socialist Left Party (Socialistisk Venstreparti), previously engaged in the Sri 
Lankan negotiations, became a minority opposition party. The change had no effect 
whatsoever on the Norwegian involvement in the Sri Lankan peace talks. The Tamil 
community in Norway (population of refugees counting over 10,000, many of whom
8" Bullion, A. (2001): Norway and the peace process in Sri Lanka. Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No.3, p. 70 -  92, Frank 
Cass, London.
83 Bullion, p. 77.
84 Pruitt, D. G: Mediator Behavior and Success in Mediation in Bercovitch, J., ed. (2002): Studies in 
International Mediation. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 51.
85 Bullion, p. 77.
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work in the fishing industry) is considered to be a minor side effect of the Norwegian 
initiative in the peace process.
6.2.1 Norwegian initiative in Sri Lanka
After the failure of the first peace attempts in Sri Lanka facilitated by India, the 
next peace initiative came in January 1995. The new People’s Alliance coalition 
government was skeptical of the idea of inviting a new third party mediator since the 
first such attempt was not successful. Newly elected President Kamaratunga in mid- 
1997 first approached Norway to enter the peace talks86. The first Norwegian 
appearance in the negotiation did not conclude with any great accomplishment. The 
talks were initiated by the Government side and failed because of a lack of trust on 
both sides. The Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People’s 
Liberation Front)87 and chauvinist Buddhist monks undermined the Government 
peace actions. Despite the mediator’s attempts, the war was re-ignited. Norway was 
called back in 1998 to facilitate talks between the GOSL and the LTTE88. Either side 
was not prepared to compromise on discussed items (i.e. the separate status of the 
Northeast region). Even though the Tigers declared a unilateral ceasefire on 
December 24, 2000 and renewed the ceasefire (truce) every month until April 2001, 
the Government did not recognize their demands, which the Tamil required in order 
to enter the negotiation. The Norwegian government was immensely active in 
bringing the two parties to a table. The Norwegians deployed a speciál peace envoy, 
Erik Solheim89, to lead exclusive talks with both the LTTE leadership and the 
Governmenťs highest representatives (President Kamaratunga and prime minister 
Wickremesinghe) after the hardest fighting after the unilateral LTTE truce in April 
2001. Solheim was often accused by the Sinhalese public for being impartial and too
86 As Sisk mentions (Sisk, T.: Peacemaking processes: forestalling retům to ethnic violence in: Zartman, W., ed. 
(2001): Preventivě negotiation: avoiding conflict escalation. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, lne, Lanham, 
Maryland, p. 76) president Kumaratunga firstly sought the mediation assistance of the government of France.
The French refused and offered the assistance of Franfois Michelle instead. The LTTE did not agree with any 
other assistance than that of a government. Bullion mentions that India opposed any strong mediator (such as the 
USA) being involved in South Asian intemal affairs. Norway, as a representative of a weak statě, was acceptable 
for everybody, Billion, p. 79.
87 JVP is a Maoist revolutionary organization opposing any modemization attempts.
88 Prior to that in 1996, the LTTE lost their control of the Jaffna stronghold which struck their confidence in 
winning the war militarily.




friendly towards the key Tamil for his bargaining with the Tamils. The anti Solheim 
notion led to his removal from the negotiations90. Colombo requested an upgrade of 
the Oslo participation and hence to deal directly with the foreign minister Thorbjoern 
Jagland instead of Solheim. The Norwegian initiative was jeopardized by 
Government attempts to recapture the Elephant Pass leading to Jaffna and the 
LTTE’s efforts to gain full military control over the city of Jaffna. Despite the 
Norwegian involvement, the parties preferred the military solution to the crisis instead 
of seeking peace settlement at that moment. A shift in the process occurred in 2001 
when the moderate UNP won the parliamentary elections. Additionally, the LTTE’s 
attitude towards negotiations changed radically after the September 11 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. Hence the label terrorism gained very negative 
associations and the LTTE was very keen on acquiring legitimacy through successful 
peace talks. The major Norwegian contribution to the peace in Sri Lanka results from 
this negotiation wave leading to signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU, 
know also as the Ceasefire agreement) in February 2002. In addition, The Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) under the Norwegian command played a significant role 
in securing the observance of the Ceasefire agreement. The function of the SLMM 
and the Norwegian involvement in it is often criticized. The SLFP representatives 
expressed via Laksman Kadirgamar91 an opinion that the Norwegian involvement in 
the mission exceeded its role as a third party mediator. Kadirgamar was referring to 
the fact that SLMM could decide on violating the Ceasefire agreement at the site of 
an accident. For instance, the Sea Tigers92 were often accused of violating the parts 
of the Ceasefire agreement dealing with the movement on the sea. The 
Scandinavian93 members of the SLMM were sometimes indicted for being impartial 
and siding with the LTTE’s Sea Tigers. Despite all these allegations, the Norwegian 
participation in the SLMM cannot be compared to the Indián deployment of the 
peacekeeping forces at the end of 1980s. The SLMM was not engaged in fighting
90 “Criticism o f Solheim ’s role and objectivity, which had been voiced by some Sinhala opposition politicians, 
was now being taken seriously by the government. It was felt that Solheim was ‘tainteď by being too friendly 
towards key Tamil and had becomepartisan in his pronouncements. Bullion, p. 75.
91 Laksman Kadirgamar was the People’s Alliance’s member of the Parliament and long time advisor to 
President Kamaratunga. Since 2004 Kadirgamar has been the Sri Lankan minister of foreign affairs.
92 The “Sea Tigers” is the LTTE navy unit. The head of the monitoring mission, generál Trond Furuhovde, 
proposed that the Government and the Sri Lankan navy should recognize the Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit 
in the spirit of the Ceasefire agreement. The opposition parties háve called this proposal “preposterous” referring 
to it as to a sign of siding with the LTTE.




against any groups. Their only task was to monitor the situation, serve as an 
immediate facilitator, and be the finál authority regarding interpretation of the 
agreement in čase of disputes between the LTTE and GOSL forces94
The set of six peace sessions95 between the Government and the LTTE 
brought many important moments in the history of the peace process, such as 
creation of the sub-committees dealing with the reconstruction agenda and gaining 
reliability of the donor countries. Regardless of all the attempts of the Norwegian 
government, their involvement is still perceived positively by all the Sinhalese 
representation. The Marxist party, JVP, which is currently the key member of the 
SLFP led coalition, identifies the Norwegian initiative as ‘foreign interference’ and is 
opposed to their further involvement in facilitating the peace process in Sri Lanka.
6.3 Leadinq economic power -  Japan
Japan was the last of the three mediators to enter the peace process 
negotiations96. In 2003 Japan hosted 6th session of the first round of the peace 
negotiations. It became primarily interested in organizing the financial help for Sri 
Lanka and is one of the most important donor countries. Japan represents one of the 
strongest Asian and world-leading economies and is keen on maintaining stability in 
the Southeast Asia. In the Sri Lankan conflict, the main focus of the Japanese 
government was answering calls for immediate humanitarian assistance, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The major contribution of Japan to the 
peace process was facilitating conferences for donors. The presence (and 
assistance) of the leading economic power helped with gaining trust of other donors.
94 The opposition PA coalition often accused the UNP and Prime minister Wickremesinghe of diminishing the
role of the official Government authorities by giving the right of finál authority regarding the interpretation of 
the Ceasefire agreement to the Scandinavian monitors. Kadirgamar talks about “the jurisdiction o f the Courts o f 
Sri Lanka has been ousted on a question so vital to national security and the protection o f the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty o f  Sri Lanka” and “The Norwegian Government has now been cast in the role o f a mediator or 
arbitrator, and the Monitoring Mission has been given the role o f  a judge, in the resolution o f disputes between 
the parties which is not the basis on which Norwegian assistance was sought in the first plače. Source:
Kadirgamar’s speech from session of the Parliament on May 8, 2003. Source: the official Government website 
(www.priu.gov.lk).
95 The summary of the six sessions of the peace talks is at the end of this chapter.
96 Apart frorn organizing the intemational economic aid to Sri Lanka, Japan is one of the three major donors. 
Together with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank shares in assistance of 74% of all the 
development aid (ADB -  47%, WB -  19%, and Japan 8%). Source: The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Document -  Japan’s Country Assistance Program for Sri Lanka.
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On the other hand, Japan was not very active in facilitating direct talks between the 
LTTE and the Government. Such assistance is not the most typical example of the 
mediation doně by a third party. However, this assistance meant immense help to Sri 
Lanka since the financial help to the country is the most beneficial to heal scars after 
more than twenty years of the ethnic war. Carnevale defines this type of mediation as 
a “reward power”. The reward power “involves mediator provision of rewards or 
benefits in exchange for agreement or compromise”97. Japanese initiative to attract 
countries to fund the rebuilding of Sri Lanka, and especially the Northeast part of the 
island, works on the same principles. Japan reached a speciál status in the mediation 
by providing the Government and the LTTE with financial opportunities. Japan did not 
act as a classic superpower since it did not ušed any threats or pressures to achieve 
the agreement between the parties of the conflict. Instead of being involved in finding 
a political solution to the long-time dispute, Japan chose to react to the socio- 
economic side of the conflict. In the statement issued by the Japanese ministry of 
foreign affairs, Japan’s motivation was defined: “The promotion of Sri Lanka’s sociál 
and economic development through the extension of assistance can greatly 
contribute to the consolidation of democracy and political stability in the entire South 
Asia region."98 Japan has been providing economic aid since 1954 when it started 
with technical cooperation and provision of yen loans. From the time when Japan 
begun its engagement in the Sri Lankan affairs it has always maintained a politically 
neutrál Stance regarding the domestic political affairs. In contrast to allegations of the 
Norwegian mediation being impartial and too friendly to the Tamil, Japanese háve 
never lost their detachment.
97 Carnevale. P..J. Mediating from Strength in Bercovitch, J„ ed. (2002): Studies in International Mediation. 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 30.
98 Source: The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mofa.go.jp): Document -  Japan’s Country Assistance 
Program for Sri Lanka, p. 10.
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Peace talks after signinq the Ceasefire agreement (Memorandum of Understandinq)
D á te , P la č e : D is c u s s e d  to p ic s : R e s u lts :
S e p te m b e r 1 6 - 1 8 ,  
2002
S a ttah ip  N ava l Base, 
C h on bu ri, T h a ila n d
• A p p lica tio n  o f  th e  C e ase fire  
a g re e m e n t
• H u m a n ita ria n  needs
• F u tu re  pe ace  ta lks
•  A g re e d  to  es ta b lish  a jo in t 
ta s k  fo rce  fo r hu m an ita ria n  
and  re co n s tru c tio n  ac tiv itie s
O c to b e r 3 1 -  N o ve m b e r 
3, 2002
R ose  G arden  Hote l, 
N a kho rn  P a thom , 
T ha ila nd
•  R e co n s tru c tio n
•  R e ha b ilita tio n
• S in h a la  c o m m u n ity  in th e  E aste rn  
p ro v in ce
• H u m an  rights
•  C o m m u n ica tio n  be tw een  th e  LTTE 
and th e  G o ve rn m e n t
•  A g re e d  to  a se t o f m ea su re s  
to  im p rove  th e  se cu rity  and 
hu m an  righ ts  s itua tion
•  A g re e d  to  re co n s titu te  the  
S LM M  Loca l M on ito ring  
C o m m itte e s
•  A g re e d  to  es ta b lish  d ire c t 
c o m m u n ica tio n  be tw ee n  the  
co m m a n d e rs  o f the  LTTE  and  
th e  G O S L  S pec iá l T a sk  
F o rce
•  A g re e d  to  es ta b lish  peace  
c o m m itte e s  (in c lud in g  both 
loca l LTTE  and G O S L 
le ad e rs )
D e ce m b e r 2 - 5 ,  20 02
R a d isso n  S A S  P laza  
H ote l, O slo , N orw ay
• C o n so lid a tio n  o f th e  C e ase fire  
a g re e m e n t
•  P o litica l m a tte rs  (s ta tě  s truc tu re )
•  H u m a n ita ria n  ac tio n  (s itua tion  o f 
ch ild re n  a ffec ted  by a rm e d  con flic t)
•  A g re e d  to exp lo re  a po litica l 
so lu tio n  fou nde d  on in te rna l 
se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  based on a 
fe d e ra i s tru c tu re  w ith in  a 
un ited  S ri Lanka
•  A g re e d  th a t LTTE  w ill a cce p t 
th e  rig h t o f po litica l g ro up s  to  
ca rry  o u t po litica l w o rk
•  A g re e d  th a t pa rties  w ill 
fa c ilita te  res to ra tion  and 
re h a b ilita tio n  o f p lace s  o f 
w o rs h ip  in th e  N orth  and the  
E as t
Ja n u a ry  6 - 9 ,  20 03
R ose G arden  Hote l, 
N a kho rn  P a thom , 
T ha ila nd
•  Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f u rgen t 
hu m a n ita ria n  p rio ritie s
• P rov is ion  o f fu n d s  by do no r 
g o ve rn m e n ts
• H igh S e cu rity  Z o n e s
•  In te rna l D isp la ced  P erso ns  (ID P s)
•  A c tio n  p ian on re se ttle m e n t 
o f  ID P s and  re fu g e e s  in 
a re a s  w ith in  the  H igh 
S e cu rity  Z ones
•  E s ta b lish e d  th e  N orth  E ast 
R e co n s tru c tio n  Fund (N E R F)
F e b ru a ry  7 - 8 ,  2003
N o rw eg ia n  E m bassy, 
N o rd ic  E m ba ssy  
C om p lex , B erlin , 
G e rm a n y
• U n de ra g e  re c ru itm e n t
•  S itua tion  a t th e  sea  (the D e lft 
is land s  inc iden t)
•  P rog ress  in so lv ing  th e  hu m an ita ria n  
s itua tion  in th e  N o rth ea s t
•  LTTE  p led ged  to  s top  
u n d e ra g e  rec ru itm en t
•  E s ta b lish e d  th re e  co m m itte e s  
to  m o n ito r the  M uslim  
s itu a tio n  in the  E aste rn  
P rov ince
•  S o u g h t he lp  o f  in te rna tiona l 
hu m an  righ ts  adv ise r, lan 
M artin , to  d ra w  up a road 
m ap  fo r hu m an  righ ts  issu es  
re la tin g  the  peace  p rocess
M arch  1 8 - 2 1 , 2 0 0 3
H a kon e  P rin ce  Hote l, 
H a k o n e ,J a p a n
•  P ow er sha ring
•  Im p rov ing  th e  se cu rity  s itua tion
•  S ea in c id e n t from  M arch  10, 20 03
•  P o litica l m a tte rs  (fede ra i s truc tu re )
•  S tre n g th e n e d  th e  m an da te  
a n d  ca p a c ity  o f th e  S LM M
•  S ch e d u le d  a spec iá l m ee ting  
re g a rd in g  the  sea  inc iden ts , 
b e tw ee n  se n io r nava l and 
po litica l re p re se n ta tive s
•  C o m m itm e n t to d e ve lo p  a 
fe d e ra i s truc tu re
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7. Application of Adiusted Winner to the conflict in Sri Lanka
As mentioned in the above chapters, many mediation attempts trying to solve 
the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka háve failed. In 1994 President Kumaratunga and her 
People’s Alliance (PA) coalition won the election, promising to solve the ethnic 
conflict by peaceful means. Nevertheless, the negotiations with LTTE were not 
successful. Neither party was prepared to compromise on any of the major issues; 
such as including a level of political autonomy in the Northeast; the LTTE was still 
fighting for the separate statě concept. The Sinhalese public often accused the 
Tamils of using the time during negotiations to recruit new cadres and to prepare for 
new fighting. According to Lakshman Kadirgamar , Presidenťs advisor, the peace 
talks in 1994 did not succeed because they did not háve “the 9/11 phenomenon 
The tabel “terrorist” did not contain the same kind of negative connotation in 
1994/1995 and thus was perceived differently. Under those circumstances the LTTE 
was not willing to compromise. When the Government brought in international 
monitors (Canadians, Norwegians, Dutch), Vellupilai Prabhakaran, the Tamil leader, 
did not grant them entrance to the Tamil controlled areas in the Northeast region. 
After the failure of the peace talks, both sides resolved to end the conflict by military 
means9 100. LTTE was waiting for the results of the generál elections in October 2000. 
They assumed that if the UNP101 won they could gain more concessions by starting 
fresh negotiations with the new government102. The new UNP Government declared 
that the policy towards the LTTE would continue. When the Tamils’ hopes to start 
peace talks from a different angle failed, they contacted the Norwegian facilitators 
and approach the Government. On December 24, 2001 LTTE surprisingly proclaimed 
a unilateral ceasefire. The government did not acknowledge the unilateral ceasefire 
at that time because they were not prepared for such a step. The peace talks finally 
recommenced after seven years in February 2002 when the Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed.
99 The interview with Lakshman Kadirgamar, advisor to President Kumaratunga (and current minister of foreign 
affairs), was published on the Government website (www.priu.gov.lk) under the title: ”Structure o f State is most 
fundamental questiori\ on September 30, 2002.
100 In 1999 LTTE carried out an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the president.
101 United National Party.
102 Led by the United National Party.
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The purpose of this work is to present a plausible illustration of how the Sri 
Lankan conflict could be resolved by using a new method -  the Adjusted Winner 
proceduře. The analysis relies on documents released by the LTTE, the Government 
of Sri Lanka, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and statements avaiiable from 
past negotiations103. In ideál scenario, the point allocation would be based on direct 
talks with both the LTTE’s and the Governmenťs representatives. However such a 
process was not feasible for the proposal of this Master’s thesis. Steven Brams said 
in one of the many discussions with the author that in such a čase, when it is 
impossible to talk directly to the actors of the dispute or mediators104, the best way to 
allocate the points is to interview experts on the region of the conflict. The author 
interviewed Jan Filipsky of the Oriental Institute by the Academy of Sciences of the 
Czech Republic and Radek Novotný, Charles University PhD student, who are 
engaged in research of the conflict in Sri Lanka. The point allocation for the AW 
proceduře is based on talks with those experts and official press releases of the Sri 
Lankan Government and the LTTE secretariat.
It is important to chose the right period of the conflict for applying the AW 
proceduře. On February 22, 2002, Ranil Wickremasinghe, the prime minister of Sri 
Lanka, and Vellupilai Prabhakaran, leader of the LTTE, signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), a ceasefire agreement that enabled further negotiations105. All 
of the previous peace talks had failed due to a lack of trust between the Tamils and 
Sinhalese. To avoid generál mistrust, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was 
established to oversee adherence to the MOU in the Northeast of the country. If the 
Adjusted Winner proceduře were to be applied in reál negotiations between the Sri 
Lankan government and the Tamil representatives, the period of time after the 
signing of the Memorandum of Understanding would be the best suited occasion. 
The AW application for this páper will thus be placed in this time period.
103 Especially the three sessions of the negotiation after signing the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002, the 
first round from September 16 -  18 in Sattahip Naval Base, Thailand, the second round in the Rose Garden 
Resort near Bangkok, Thailand from October 31 to November 3, 2002, and the third round in Oslo, Norway 
from December 2 - 5 ,  2002.
104 The author contacted the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to obtain the information necessary for the 
AW point allocation. However helpful they were in gaining additional documents regarding the conflict in Sri 
Fanka, the Norwegian diplomats were not willing to release such information needful for the AW proceduře.
105 Ranil Wickremasinghe talked about this in his speech as a first step towards new peace negotiations. “It
should be seen as a reasonable andpracticalfoundation on which apolitical solution to this seemingly 





7.1.1 Government of Srí Lanka (GOSL)
When referring to the Government, the author means the Sinhalese 
representation. It is clear that it is not a sole, hegemonie player, however for the 
purposes of this analysis the Government represents the opposite of the LTTE, the 
Sinhalese and the official Sri Lankan representation. In reality the Sinhala 
community is not united under one party; in fact it suffers from disunity with three 
major parties competing against each other. The United National Party (UNP) is 
believed to háve a more counter approach towards the peace negotiations. Under 
their government, major concessions towards the Tamil were made (signing the 
Memorandum of Understanding). On the other hand the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP) is less open to compromises and often uses the Sinhalese nationalist as their 
agenda. President Kumaratunga108 has been in Office since 1994. However this 
does not guarantee the continuity and consistency of the Governmenťs policy 
towards the Tamil minority. Since 1994 the President has dissolved Parliament twice 
(October, 2001, November, 2003). The newly elected parliament declares its 
intentions to end the bloody conflict in the Northeast region of the island, however the 
Sinhala party has never been successful. The Sinhala disunity thus negatively affects 
the whole peace process.
Until 1994 the GOSL was rather reluctant to deal with the ethnic erisis. This 
was based on active Sinhala nationalism. Every sign of possible decentralization was 
followed with strong Sinhala uprising and protests. Secondly, the Sinhalese 
representation is not united, and their image often suffers from political campaigning, 
corruption affairs109, and censorship imposed upon the coverage of the conflict in the
106 For the purposes of this thesis, the AW proceduře is only applied to two players. The other minor actor is the 
Muslim community as the third largest ethnic group on the island.
107 SLFP - Sri Lanka Freedom Party, UNP -  United National Party, and JVP -  Marxist People’s Liberation 
Front.
108 In the Sri Lankan political systém the president has a speciál position. Constitutional changes from 1978 
introduced the office of the executive president. The president oversees the executive power, which often clashes 
with the authority ofthe prime minister. For instance, when Prime Minister Wickramasinghe signed the 
Ceasefire agreement with the LTTE leader in February 2002 President Kumaratunga was opposed to it. This was 
not a very good reflection of the supposed unity of the executive power.
109 “Government ministers, businessmen, and army personnel háve enriched themselves by knowingly procuring 
dilapidated military equipment and skimming o ff hefty commissions; some military officers háve even been
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Jaffna region. The Government adheres to the unitary model, which limits its 
negotiation potential. According to Singer110 the Sinhalese never understood the 
concept of “federalism” while behind every power devolution effort, they see the 
potential division of the island. They regard Sri Lanka as their only home, whereas 
the Tamil inhabit areas in India (statě Tamil Nadu). The fearfrom the influence of the 
Tamil factor from outside of Sri Lanka plays an important role in the Sinhalese 
behavior in the conflict When some concessions are made to the Tamil minority 
they are often latě and thus spoil the perception of the deed. The Government had 
believed for a long time that the conflict could be won militarily. After signing the 
ceasefire agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding, on 22 February 2002, the 
Presidenťs coalition, People’s Alliance (PA), openly criticized the Government for 
taking too mild an approach during the first peace negotiation in Thailand. Lakshman 
Kadirgamar, long-time member of the SLFP party and advisor to President 
Kumaratunga, said in an interview111 published on the official government website 
that the Government acted incorrectly by not taking the initiative in forming the statě 
structure during the first session of the first round of peace talks. By prolonging the 
time before the debate reached this issue, the Tamil side, according to Kadirgamar, 
could strengthen its position in the Northeast, which would ameliorate their position 
for future negotiations of statě structure.
7.1.2 Tamils
7.1.2.1 Sri Lankan Tamil vs. Indián Tamil
Ethnically the Tamils in Sri Lanka are divided into two groups -  the native Sri 
Lankan Tamil and the Indián Tamils112. The only feature these two groups share is 
their language and religion. However, since they are Hindu, the caste systém 
disables the integration of the two groups. The majority of the Indián Tamils were
accused o f smugglingfor the LTTE. In short, many politicians and military offlcials consider the war a boon to 
their careers, and there is consequently apowerful lobby favoring continued war. ” DeVotta, p. 187.
110 Singer, M.. R. (1992): Sri Lankars Tamil-Sinhalese ethnic conflict: alternativě Solutions: Asian Survey, Vol. 
32, No. 8, 712-722, University of Califomia Press.
111 The interview is from September 30, 2002.
112 The Indián Tamils came from India to Sri Lanka to work on the tea plantations during the British govemance 
in early 19* century.
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plantation workers and was regarded as of the lower caste by the native Sri Lankan 
Tamil elite. Secondly, the Indián Tamils live mostly in the centrál hills and in Colombo 
and its suburbs, while the Sri Lankan Tamils are concentrated mostly in the North 
and the East of the island. The LTTE aims to address both groups, nevertheless they 
háve not been very successful in getting support from the Indián Tamils. The Indián 
Tamils tend to prefer cooperation with the national political parties such as UNP and 
SLFP. The Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC) gathered the Indián Tamil and 
exceeded its originál purpose as the labor union and became the political voice of the 
Indián Tamil. The ethnic division of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka adds to the 
confusion in the Tamil representation. In the peace talks the LTTE was the 
representative of the Tamil minority. For the purposes of this work, when referring to 
the Tamil it is important to keep in mind that this means the Tamil represented by the 
LTTE113. It is politically and ethnically unclear, however suitable for the purposes of 
the Adjusted Winner application.
7.1.2.2 Tamil nationalism
The originál cause of Tamil national struggle is Sinhala nationalism, their fight 
for Sinhala as the sole official language in the island, and the failure of the 
governmental institutions to protéct the national rights of the Tamil minority. 
Announced Constitutional changes in 1972 gave Tamils some hope - but the results 
were not positive. Neil DeVotta mentions: "The 1972 constitution especially had a 
profound psychological impact on Tamils, because while Sinhalese ethnocentrism 
had hitherto been advocated through rhetoric, parliamentary bills (which could always 
be changed by majority vote), and selective practices within the bureaucracies, that 
ethnocentrism was now constitutionalized.” 114. Reacting to those tendencies, the 
Tamil groups radicalized. The rejection and dilatory attitude towards moderate Tamils 
(represented by the Tamil United Liberation Front) during the district council
113 It has to be mentioned that some disputes exist between the Tamil Tigers representation from North and from 
East. E. Kaushalyan, the leader of the LTTE in eastem Sri Lanka was shot dead together with four of his 
bodyguards on February 7. Kaushalyan is the most senior LTTE member killed since the signing of the Ceasefire 
agreement in February 2002. The LTTE accused the army paramilitaries, however the breakaway LTTE faction 
under V. Muralitharan command (know as Karuna) claimed responsibility for the killing of the pro Prabhakaran 
politician. Karuna seceded from the LTTE in March 2004 claiming that “northem” leaders were monopolizing 
power at the expense of the East.
114 DeVotta, N. (2004): Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford. (p. 167).
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discussion created an environment for the younger, more radical generation. In 1970 
Tamil youth formed the Tamil Studeníš’ Federation, which transformed into the Tamil 
New Tigers and later in 1976 to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) under 
Vellupilai Prabhakaran115. Since then the LTTE has had the strongest position among 
all116 Tamil groups and the leadership role in the peace negotiations with the 
government of Sri Lanka. It has to be noted that there are some doubts concerning 
the political pluralism under the LTTE governance in the Northeast. In May 2003, the 
representatives of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) sent an open letter 
to President Kamaratunga asking for a guarantee from the LTTE that it would 
recognize democratic pluralism and the democratic rights of the people in the 
Northeast117. The members of the Tamil democratic political parties, EPDP and 
PLOTE, were attacked by the LTTE combatants. The LTTE is very keen on 
strengthening its role as the Tamil representation and is not tolerant to any kind of 
opposition coming from the other Tamil parties. The LTTE is not represented in the 
Sri Lankan Parliament; however in the Governmenťs talks the Tamil parliamentary 
parties gather in a parliamentary selected committee (Tamil National Alliance, Tamil 
United Liberation Front) did not meet with any success. Hence, for the purposes of 
the Adjusted Winner application, LTTE will be regarded as the sole representation of 
the Tamil minority, and their views will be ušed while assigning points in the point 
allocation part of the AW proceduře.
The key issue for the Tamils is the level of independence. The moderate Tamil 
representation in the 1960s enforced decentralization of the island and would háve 
been satisfied only with devolution of centrál power. However the radicalized youth 
under the banner of LTTE claimed separation of the northern and eastern Tamil
115 Vellupilai Prabhakaran founded the Tamil New Tigers (renamed to LTTE in 1976) in 1972 when he was 18 
years old. He has been the Tamil leader ever since. Prabhakaran, who is widely admired by the Tamil 
population, managed to tum the LTTE army into a highly disciplined and highly motivated guerrilla force. 
Under his leadership the GOSL army did not defeat the Tamil guerillas even though they were outnumbered.
116 The other Tamil organizations are the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil 
Eelam Liberation Organization (TĚLO), the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), and the 
Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).
117 The EPDP’s official open letter to President Kamaratunga was published on the official GOSL website on 
May 6, 2003. Apart from request for the LTTE’s undertaking of the political pluralism in the Northeast, EPDP 
asked the president for the retům of their weapons. The EPDP’s guarding unit handed its arms to the 
Government forces under the Ceasefire agreement. Due to continuing harassment from the LTTE cadres, the 
EPDPS’s members did not feel safe and demanded restitution of its arms’ assets.
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provinces and creation of the independent statě Tamil eelam118. Until 2001 the only 
acceptable solution to the ethnic crisis for LTTE was complete separation and the 
creation of independent Tamil statě119. The turning point came in November 2001 
when LTTE announced that they would accept autonomy within the statě of Sri 
Lanka. The LTTE leader, Vellupilai Prabhakaran, declared that the Tamil people 
“wanted to live in their traditional lands with peace and dignity, determining their own 
political and economic life. It is the basic political aspiration of the Tamil people. This 
is neither separatism nor terrorism. It does not constitute a threat to the Sinhala 
people.”120 Implying that the separate statě was not the only alternativě for LTTE was 
a significant improvement with great potential for the future peace talks and 
negotiations. This is important for the AW proceduře as well because it gives us more 
space to define the issues of the conflict. The LTTE must first transform from a 
liberation movement to a political party that can participate in elections and other 
democratic procedures. The fact that the LTTE háve been labeled terrorists led to the 
end of the peace process which started in February 2002 after the signing of the 
Ceasefire agreement. The LTTE was not invited to the Sri Lanka donor meeting in 
Washington on April 14, 2003 by the US government121 and the Government did not 
support the Tamil call for the meeting relocation. On the other hand, the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) reported 1403 complaints against the LTTE for violating 
the Ceasefire agreement and only 385 complaints against the Government122. This is 
yet another confirmation of the disunity in the Tamil community. On one hand, the 
moderate part of the LTTE is very supportive of the peace process and adherent to
118 DeVotta talks about the three Tamil generations: "The first includes older Tamil like Anton Balasingham, who 
háve cohabited with Sinhalese, may speak some Sinhala, and realize that the two ethnic groups can coexist 
provided that the Tamils are allowed broad devolution. The second generation includes those o f Prabhakaran ’s 
age group, who are reaching middle age and may be mellowing in their separatist views. It is remotely possible 
that this group, too, could be persuaded to settle fo r  a settlement short o f dividing the country. The last 
generation, however consists o f young fighters who háve known nothing but war and destruction. Having been 
indoctrinated to hatě Sinhalese by the LTTE and sufferedpersecution by the Sri Lankan armedforces, this group 
may be the most violently committed to pursuing eelam. " (De Votta, p. 180).
119 Eelam is term for ’homelanď in Tamil.
120 Source: Tamil Eelam homepage: www.eelam.com . Press releases 2001: 
http://eelam.eom/freedom_struggle/ltte_press_releases/2001/PR20011127.html.
121 The LTTE was not invited to the donor meeting in Washington due to its ban in the USA. The LTTE has been 
on the US list of foreign terrorist organizations since 1997. This was not the only reason why the peace talks 
failed. The Sinhala opposition parties made every effort to jeopardize the negotiations. They accused the 
Government of politics of appeasement towards the LTTE for considering legalizing the LTTE’s Sea Tigers and 
allowing the discussion about leaving the High Security Zone in the Jaffha region.
122 The report from the SLMM was published in reaction to the Sinhala opposition on the Government official 
website on April 28, 2003.
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the Memorandum of Understanding. The radical Tamil wing, however, does not 
believe in the peace process and violates everything that has been agreed upon.
7.1.3 The Muslim communitv123
The Muslim community is not directly engaged in the conflict; nevertheless 
with 7% it represents the third largest ethnic group in Sri Lanka. The Muslims háve 
played an important role in the country’s politics124. Until the emergence of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) in the 1980s, the Muslims had been part of 
principál political parties. They were represented on all levels throughout the national 
political spectrum, especially in UNP and SLFP. Secondly, unlike the Sinhalese and 
Tamils, they base their identity on their religion. The Muslim community125 is mostly 
concentrated in the East (a regional with Tamil majority), hence it must be considered 
as a potential participant in the discussion. Nonetheless for the purposes of the AW 
application, the Muslim community will not be regarded as a player126 but only as a 
secondary actor. Respecting the role of the Muslims in Sri Lanka, one of the items 
will be the Muslim participation in the negotiations.
7.2 Items in Sri Lanka
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is essential to formulate the issues for 
the AW proceduře in a way that they all could be separable (i.e. winning one issue 
cannot mean automatic gain of another issue). If this is not feasible the application of 
the AW proceduře to the conflict in Sri Lanka should not be recommended.
123 The Sri Lankan Muslim originally came from Malabar, India. They speak the Tamil language, however their 
ethnic identity is tied to their religion. The forth largest religious group on the island is the Christians. Their 
population includes both Sinhalese and Tamil. Source: DeVotta, N. (1998): Sri Lanka’s structural adjustment 
program and its impact on Indo-Lanka Relations. Asian Survey, Vol.38, No.5, 457-473. University of Califomia 
Press.
124 For instance, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress caused the fall of the Government by leaving the People’s 
Alliance govemment coalition in June 2001. The coalition lost its majority with the 11 SLMC MPs. The 
political crisis led to a vote of no confidence in the parliament. President Kamaratunga suspended the parliament 
in order to prevent the Govemment from a certain defeat.
125 Muslims in Sri Lanka are Tamil speaking.
126 It is possible to apply the AW proceduře to the three party negotiations, however it is very difficult when the 
parties do not share equal positions. “ When there are more than two parties, there is no proceduře that will 
simultaneously satisfy envy-freeness, efficiency, and equability. However, it turns out that it is always possible to 
find  an allocation that satisfies two o f  the three p ro p e r tie s Brams, Taylor, p.84.
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These ten issues were chosen based on available statements and 
propositions127 of both parties and the history of the conflict. Secondly, it is essential 
for a successful mediation to recognize flexibility of each player128. For instance the 
question of transforming the country into two separate States is out of plače since the 
Government of Sri Lanka repeatedly conspicuously articulated that keeping the 
country of Sri Lanka unified is their number one priority. In Oslo the parties agreed to 
explore a solution based on a federal structure129. This is the furthest into the Tamil 
request that the Government is willing to go. It defines the range of the item Level of 
political autonomy with maximum for the Tamil being an autonomy status within a 
federal structure and the maximum for the Government being to keep the unitary 
structure of the government. The item Distribution of funds in the Northeast covers 
all economic issues since they cannot be separated into individual issues such as 
control over the donor funds in the Northeast or controlling the economic policy in the 
Northeast.
The question of human rights is not included in this analysis since both sides 
agree on protecting human rights. How this will be doně is part of the political agenda 
and hence is included in the item dealing with political representation. One of the 
prime issues of the conflict in Sri Lanka attracting the international interest is the 
question of child recruitment by the LTTE cadres. UNICEF has frequently expressed 
its interests and concerns. The LTTE denies new child recruitment however some 
reports háve proved otherwise130. For the purposes of the Adjusted Winner 
proceduře it is hard to put these issues into an item. Both sides repeatedly 
condemned violating human (and children) rights and come to mutual agreement on 
these issues in the Memorandum of Understanding. It is the question of adhering to
127 One of the most significant propositions was the LTTE proposal to Interim Self-Govemance Authority from 
November 2003.
1-8 Mediation lacking flexibility can hardly be successful. Even a proceduře like the Adjusted Winner requires 
some flexibility from its actors. Stenelo in his work Mediation in International Negotiations emphasizes the 
importance of the flexibility of players. “The degree o f flexibility in the parties ’ goal formulation is therefore o f  
centrál strategie significance to the mediator. In certain respects, the use o f ambiguous formulations may 
certainly help maintain other parties ’ expectations, but it also complicates the task o f suggesting concrete 
compromise Solutions. This problém is also exacerbated by difficulties in making accurate prognos es.” Stenelo, 
L-G, (1972): Mediation in international negotiations. Nordens boktryckeri, Molmo.
'~9The official statement of the Norwegian government after the third session of the first round from December 
5, 2002: “Responding to a proposal by the leadership o f the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution 
founded on the principle o f internal self-determination in areas ofhistorical habitation o f the Tamil-speaking 
peoples, based on a federal structure within a United Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has 
to be acceptable to all communities”.
130 DeVotta, p. 176.
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the ceasefire agreement and basic human rights. Ever since both sides generally 
agreed on this matter it cannot be an issue for this AW proceduře. However 
questions regarding observance of the ceasefire agreement can occur in the debate 
during the peace talks. Both parties agree that it is essential to guarantee 
observance of basic human and children rights; the question is who would be in 
charge of that in the Northeast -  who would be the enforcer and decision-making 
body (creating the rules) of it in the Northeast. It is not a question of human rights 
(both parties agree on that) however it is a political question of which agenda would 
be under the item dealing with the Level of political autonomy. The enforcement of it 
would be under the item Institutions of Administration of Justice -  whichever party 
wins this item would be in control of the observance of human rights in the Northeast.
7.2.1
1. Level of political autonomy
This item is unambiguously the prime topič of the entire peace 
negotiations. At this point, it is clear that the Tamil community ought to receive 
some level of political autonomy. The question remains of whether it will be 
included in the autonomy status. That is being discussed in the other items. 
For the Sinhalese winning this item would mean keeping the level of the Tamil 
autonomy at the lowest level possible. For the Tamil winning this item would 
mean reaching the highest level of autonomy possible. That is a statě 
structure which would still be acceptable for the Government, thus it has to be 
within one Sri Lankan statě, i.e. a federal structure or an official autonomy 
region.
7.2.1.1
Denouncement of independent Tamil statě
Some Sinhala voices are calling for a signed testimony from the Tamil 
leader officially “accepting a single united country, embracing the entire 
/s/anď131. During the press conference in Thailand (September 18, 2002) the




Tamil representative, Anton Balasingham, explained that the Tamil do not 
operáte with the term “separate statě" -  but with the terms “homelanď and 
“self-determination” instead. They refer to such structure as a plače, where 
Tamils and Muslims (Next to the Tamil the east region is inhabited with 
Muslims.) live and enjoy substantial self-autonomy and self-government. The 
Tamils are declaring their readiness to work out the right political systém for 
everybody. In čase this approach does not work, the only other option is to 
fight for Tamil political independence and statehood. Those are their finál 
goals. The issue of a self-governing authority is a very sensitive one. From the 
other side, the Sinhalese see the Tamil struggle for self-governance as an 
attack on their national sovereignty and an attempt to split the island into two 
countries. The ethnic crisis in the Northeast region has gone too far to neglect 
the situation. Both parties value this issue and háve admitted that it is a centrál 
issue, and thus it should be discussed last in the peace talks. Balasingham 
responded to question about Tamil priorities -  “This problém has to be 
approached stage by stage and I think we had a very good start where we 
háve not only discussed about the problems of rehabilitation reconstructions, 
and resettlement of the displaced. But we háve also discussed about the 
possibility of setting up an interim administrativě set-up in the course of 
coming sessions and also we will be able to discuss in the future sessions 
about the possibility of post-interim administrativě set-up, and the core issues 
will be taken up 32”. The Tamils are seeking legitimacy for their rule over the 
areas they control. The Tamil proposed interim self-governing authority 
requires legalizing their governance in the Northeast and removing the terrorist 
label132 33. That would mean becoming an equal partner with the Government, 
which would ease further negotiations. The GOSL is likely to give some level 
of independence to the Tamils in order to také them away from an initiative for 
a separate Tamil statě. Secondly, it guarantees some kind of “official political 
representation”. The shift of the struggle away from terrorism and the quest for
132 Transcript of the press conference at the end of the first peace talks in Thailand (September 1 6 -  18, 2002). 
Published on the GOSL official website (www.priu.gov.lk , September, 18, 2002).
133 The LTTE sought advice from the Afričan National Congress (ANC) on transforming from a military to a 
political group. As reported on the GOSL official website: ''The Tigers are also sald to be keen on sending a 
delegation to South Africa to study its systém o f govemment, having already looked atfederal models in 
Europe”. This is evidence that the Tamils také the peace process seriously and explore other possibilities to end 
the conflict by peaceful means. It is important verification that the Tamils are looking into other options than a 
separate statě. ( www.priu.gov.lk, March 4, 2003).
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the separate statě would create a more civil and more manageable debate. 
Above all the Tamils would officially denounce the quest for an independent 
country, which would calm the Sinhala extremists too. This would be a step 
forward, therefore the Sinhalese háve begun to reconcile with the Tamils. In 
the post 9/11 world it is immensely important for the LTTE to lose its terrorist 
label134. Establishing a legitimate self-governing body in the Northeast region 
which would be accepted as legitimate representation would show the LTTE in 
a different light with a great possibility of the USA and the UK lifting the ban 
and erasing the LTTE from the terrorist list135. The LTTE negotiators are 
realistic and see that they háve better chances in succeeding with regional 
autonomy rather than with a separate statě. The Government has reconciled 
with the fact that the situation in the Northeast region has to be solved by 
compromising on some of the Tamil proposals. In addition, the Tamil háve de 
facto control of the Northeast region, and they are now seeking the approval of 
de jure control. It would bring them out of international isolation.
7.2.1.2
Federal structure
The world “federation” was first ušed during the Oslo conference in 
December 2002. The official statement136 of the Norwegian government from 
December 5, 2002 States: “Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the 
LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of 
internaI self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil- 
speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The 
parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all 
communities”. It is the first time when the word “federal” has been ušed in any 
of the statements regarding the Government-Tamil negotiations. Referring to 
the UN Charter the Tamil argue that they háve right to inner self-
1j4 It is important to again mention that the perception of terrorism has changed radically after September 11, 
2001 the LTTE has been on the US list of the foreign terrorist organization since 1997.
135 In India the LTTE leaders are held responsible for assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. The LTTE is 
banned in India and Indián diplomats and officials are not allowed to attend any meetings to which LTTE is a 
party. A big problém occurred when an Indián diplomat appeared at the opening ceremony of the Sri Lanka 
Peace Support Conference of Donors in Oslo on November 25, 2002.
136 The official statements of the Norwegian government were sent to the author by Ms. Lisa Golden from the 
Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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determination. Their shift from the self-determination to inner self- 
determination brings immense prospective to the negotiations. Alternatively, 
the Government is opposed to any notions potentially leading to division of the 
statě. The presidenťs speech on the National Day (February 3, 2003): 
“Solution (to the ethnic crisis -  authoťs notě) must be sought within a 
democratic framework, enshrining the indivisibility of the State and the 
sovereignty of the people. ”
7.2.1.3
Disunitv of plavers
This item is the most affected by the fact that the two players are not 
monolithic. Despite the unification of the two sides for the purposes of the AW 
proceduře, it cannot be overlooked that various parties in the Government 
háve different attitudes towards the question of Tamil autonomy. The Marxist 
People’s Liberation Front, JVP, is opposed to any concessions to the LTTE. 
After the election in 2004, JVP is the key coalition partner to SLFP and thus 
JVP’s perception of the peace negotiation paralyses the current Government. 
On the other hand the UNP government under the leadership of prime 
minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, the Government was more open to the Tamil 
proposals. The heterogeneity of actors of international and political conflicts is 
a potentially serious threat to the usefulness of the Adjusted Winner 
proceduře. Assigning points to this item is the most difficult in the AW 
application to the conflict in Sri Lanka. Both Filipsky and Novotný agreed that 
the topič is the key item. According to the experts, the Government is more 
likely to assign more points to this item than the LTTE. Firstly, the Government 
side is represented by both the SLFP and the JVP that are defending the unity 
of the island with the centrál power. Secondly, the Government 
representatives (President Kamaratunga, Prime Ministers Ranil 
Wickremasinghe (UNP) and Mahinda Rajapakse (SLFP), Lakshman 
Kadirgamar, political advisor to President Kamaratunga and since 2004 
minister of foreign affairs -  i.e. “Turn away from failures and mistakes and to 
move along the path of reconciliation and reconstruction of a strong and united 
nation-state” president Kumaratunga’s speech on the Independence Day the
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55th anniversary of independence -  Feb. 5, 2003.)137 repeatedly expressed 
their determination to keep the unity of the island. If the Government heard all 
the Tamil claims, the centrál power would háve no authority in the Northeast 
region. The current status quo with the de facto independent Tamil statě in the 
Northeast is unacceptable for the Government. The Sinhalese hope that future 
negotiation will set some boundaries and officially acknowledge the 
sovereignty of the centrál Colombo government over the whole Sri Lankan 
territory. The only field which is not being directly discussed is foreign policy, 
however the Tamil háve links to the Tamil communities in Canada, Norway, 
the United Kingdom, etc. which háve the potential to lobby for the benefit of 
the Sri Lankan Tamil population. On the other hand the LTTE is very keen on 
losing its terrorist label and therefore is willing to exchange official recognition 
for the absolute level of autonomy. Respecting all these considerations, the 
Government assigns 30 points to this item and the LTTE 25 points.
7.2.2
2. Control of Jaffna and Elephant Pass138
The Jaffna is a symbol of Tamil statehood with great historical meaning 
for the Tamil nation. The Capital of the Northeast region with the Tamil 
predominance is planned to be Trincomalee (as a compromise as it lies in 
between the North and the East however Jaffna remains the Tamil culture 
center. The region is not economically developed, it has insufficient 
infrastructure, and it often suffers from drought. After the Indián peace keeping 
forces left the area in 1990 the LTTE took de facto control over the Jaffna 
peninsula expelling Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants. The Sinhalese accused 
the LTTE of ethnic cleansing in Jaffna. The Government called on the army to 
settle the situation. In December 1995, after heavy fighting the Sri Lankan
137 Source: The official GOSL website, www.priu.gov.lk.
L'8 Kingdom of Jaffna (13* to 16* century) was the cultural center of the Tamil nation. The historical kingdom 
exceeded the borders of the Tamil controlled area in the North of the island. The most extreme Tamil requests 
call for an autonomous Tamil statě within the boarders of the Jaffna kingdom. The Elephant Pass is the strategie 
road connecting the Jaffna peninsula to the rest of the island. One of the worst events in the history of the city 
came in 1981. Between May 31 and June 2, Sinhalese radical police and army groups bumed the market area of 
Jaffna, the office of the Tamil Newspaper, the home of the member of Parliament who represents Jaffna, and the 
Jaffna Public Library. The Tamil community was deeply distressed by the damage of the library. About 95,000 
volumes were destroyed, including some culturally valuable, irreplaceable texts.
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forces regained the Jaffna peninsula and imposed the military rule. The 
Government forces controlled schools and the public building, restraining the 
Tamil influence. Losing Jaffna deeply impacted the LTTE leadership. During 
the hostilities many refugees left the city, migrating to the IDPs camps in south 
of the island or to India. The LTTE military authorities planned a number of 
offensive operations attempting to win the city back. The first successful 
attempt cane in 1998 when the LTTE forces captured the town of Kilinochchi. 
In April 23, 2000 they launched the operation ‘Oyatha Alaigal’ (‘Unceasing 
Waves lil’) and captured a strategie army base at Elephant Pass and a few 
days later on May 2 the town of Pallai near Jaffna. Capturing the strategie 
points on the Elephant Pass eut supplies to Government forces in the city of 
Jaffna. The stalemate was resolved under the Norwegian assistance while 
signing the Ceasefire agreement in February 2002. In April 2002 the highway 
to Jaffna was opened for public traffic. Regardless of the easing of the 
situation and the evident Tamil influence the LTTE did not regain exclusive 
control of the city. Because of continuing disputes, Jaffna was pronounced a 
High Security Zone (HSZ). Such status entitles the GOSL army to retain its 
presence in the region until the finál political agreement is settled. The LTTE 
wants to denounce it as an HSZ and wants the troops to leave. The LTTE’s 
argument is that with the government forces present, it is impossible for 
refugees and IDPs to return back139.
The Tamil assign immense value to the control of the Jaffna and the 
Elephant pass since losing this item would indicate losing its historical cradle 
and their national pride. Respecting that, the LTTE allocates 20 points to this 
item. On the other hand the Government does not háve the same interest in 
this item. Nonetheless the fact that this item is that important for the Tamil 
enhances the appeal of it for the Sinhalese. The Government assigns 8 points.
139 Source: The answer of the LTTE chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham, mentioned conditioning the retům of 
the refugees on the removal of the High Security Zone fřom the Jaffna region at the press conference in Hakone 




3. Institutions for administration of justice
For the Tamils, winning this item would mean separate institutions for 
administration of justice in the Northeast region. The situation de facto control 
exists, however the LTTE desires the official acknowledgment of the status 
quo. For the Government, it would mean regaining the centrál control over the 
judiciary systém in the whole country. This item may appear dependent on the 
issue concerning the political representation, thus the judicial power is one of 
the basic attributes of statehood of every sovereign statě. Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of this analysis it can be seen as an independent item. Currently, 
there are independent Tamil courts140 in the Northeast region. If they were 
legalized it could be similar to the situation in some federalized countries with 
regional judicial Systems. This topič has not received the main priority in the 
negotiations and has not been explicitly discussed. For purposes of this 
analysis, evidence from some specific cases will be ušed. The most discussed 
was the question of the Tamil political prisoners141 arrested under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), a sentence passed142 on the LTTE leader, 
Prabhakaran. The Government clearly showed their determination to control 
the judicial systém in the whole country by classifying the military operations 
undertaken by the LTTE in the past as criminal offences instead of acts of war. 
Conversely, the Tamils proposed control of the judicial power exclusively in 
the Northeast region which was not accepted by the Government. The other 
problém is the nátuře of the two judicial systems -  the official Sri Lankan 
courts were established after the British model and function under democratic 
principles. On the other hand the LTTE established courts are based on strong 
leadership rule with Prabhakaran as the only law making body. The courts in 
the Northeast are not democratic. Combining the two systems together would 
not be possible. If the Tamil won this item, the Sinhalese would officially
140 Anton Balasingham refers to such courts in his answer to a question of Hindu newspaper reportér, V S 
Sambanthan, at the press conference in Oslo after the third session of the first round of the peace talks. Source: 
GOSL official website (www.priu.gov.lk)
141 The discussion resulted in a positive outcome: a large number of prisoners were released and 75 of 193 
prisoners were released after the talks.
142 The LTTE leader, Prabhakaran was sentenced to 200 years for serious criminal offences. His actions in the 




recognize the current situation of the quasi court systém in the LTTE 
controlled areas. In čase the Government gained this item, the Tamil would 
háve to agree with the centrál court systém143 14. Supposing the item has to be 
divided, the new federal court systém would háve to be created with all levels 
compatible.
Both players are very keen on this item, thus it is not likely to be won by 
one side. If they were to share portions of this item they could define issues 
that would be under the competitions of the regional, as the čase may be 
Tamil, courts. For the Government portions -  some issues would be under the 
control of the centrál courts. The situation would resemble court structure from 
some federal countries. The Government is determined to keep the unity 
(respectively regaining the control over statě judicial systém). On February 24, 
2003 Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe said: that “he envisioned a finál 
political settlement in which Sri Lanka would háve one police force, one 
judicial systém and one military force in which Tiger members too would be 
includeď’u4. Winning this item would mean official legitimization of already 
existing situation for the Tamil community and yet again approval of their 
independence. Therefore they allocate 18 points to this item and the 
Government 14 points.
7.2.4
4. Disarmament of the LTTE cadres
The Tamil guerrilla army is structured as a regular army. The Tamil 
communities living in western countries (especially in Canada) fund the LTTE 
units. The army supplies are often smuggled on the sea. There háve been 
many incidents violating the clause of the Ceasefire agreement concerning 
weapon transportation on the sea.
143 This hypothetical mediation situation presumes that the both sides are willing to reach the finál settlement 
under the AW proceduře.
144 Source: The official GOSL website (www.priu.gov.lk), February 24, 2003.
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The LTTE disarmament issue has been discussed since the first talks in 
Thailand (16-18.September 2002). The LTTE negotiator, Anton Balasingham, 
claimed disarmament to be out of question until the needs of Tamil people 
are satisfied. This is yet another sensitive item. The Tamil consider the ability 
to háve weapons as one of the attributes of their national struggle and their 
right to self-determination. On the other hand the Sinhalese perceived this as 
ongoing threat from the LTTE. The disarmament of the Tamil cadres often 
seems as the only guarantee to end the military conflict. A significant point is 
the fact that the Tamil are willing to negotiate about this topič. Balasingham 
said after the first session of the first round: “The Question ofdisarming will not 
arise until we reach a permanent settlement that will satisfy the aspiration of 
Tamil peop/e”145. The situation did not change even after (in other ways the 
successful) peace talks in Oslo in December. The LTTE severitly 
announced146 in its statement: “the disarming of its cadres and 
decommissioning of its weapons are unacceptable and unrealistiď. The Tamil 
representation links this to the question of the High Security Zones. They háve 
been clustered around the Sri Lankan air force base in Point Pedro the only 
port on the Jaffna peninsula, so that the LTTE artillery cannot reach those 
targets. The Tamil leadership refused to hand their (the) weapons to the 
Norwegians since they feel insecure with the establishment of the High 
Security Zones. Conversely, the GOSL is not pushing this question as its 
number one priority. The chief negotiator for the Government side mentioned 
during the Sattahip press conference in September 2002 that the question of 
disarmament has to wait until the more substantial questions will be solved147. 
Stating that the Government does not consider the issue of disarmament as 
the most important one. It is a very realistic approach; the LTTE would not put 
down its arms before being granted official autonomy. Supposing the Tamil 
would win this item, they want to legalize their army and synchronize it with the
145Answer of Anton Balasingham , the head negotiator for LTTE in Thailand, at the press conference in Sattahip. 
Published atthe GOSL official (www.priu.gov.lk) on September 18, 2002.
14® Published on the official Tamil website (www.tamilnet.org) on December 26, 2002.
G.L. Peiris said: “At the beginning o f a negotiating process you do not ask for disarmament. You háve to 
achieve some progress with regard to the substantive issues and decommissioning o f weapons and 
demilitarization would come at a later stage. That is how any realistic, pragmatic negotiating process would be 




official government forces. In reality, it would mean an independent army in 
the Northeast. It was unthinkable for the Sinhalese to tolerate a second 
defense force within one unitary statě. For the Sinhalese winning this item 
would mean disarmament of the LTTE cadres. In light of all the available facts 
it is more important to Sinhalese to win this item. Apart from the fact that it is 
impossible to háve an independent army operating under Tamil command it is 
essential for the Government to protéct Sinhalese interests in the Tamil areas. 
For all these reasons the Government puts 14 points on this item and the 
LTTE 10 points.
7.2.5
5. Distribution of funds in the Northeast
Winning this item means carrying out economic policy in the Northeast. 
Supposing the Government would win this entire item, it would be able to 
control the economy of the Tamil area centrally from Colombo. On the other 
hand if the LTTE won this item they could direct the economy of the Northeast, 
háve independent international trade, and receive direct international aid 
(funds) - hence gaining official economic autonomy (This item is utterly 
independent of political autonomy). Gaining economic autonomy does not 
necessary mean gaining the political autonomy. Secondly, this item is linked to 
the issue dealing with direct economic aid to the Northeast region. After the 
tsunami at the end of 2005 there are two kinds of economic aid to the 
Northeast. The humanitarian aid helps the tsunami victims and eases the 
immediate impact of the catastrophe. However, this item is dealing rather with 
the reconstruction aid -  the resources donated to rebuild the Northeast region 
after twenty years of war.
Those two items cannot be fully separated, thus they must be put 
together. Managing humanitarian and reconstruction funds is the first step to 
controlling the economic situation in the region. It would be impossible to háve 
a functional regional economy without being able to manage those funds148.
148 Donor countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Japan subsidize the funds.
The sub-committee, established in Oslo during peace talks in December 2002, was responsible for allocating
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The economic policy is a rather important item for both players. The 
People’s Alliance government already tried in 2000 launching funds for the 
“Triple R” programs to enhance the development of the Northeast. During the 
last session of the first round of peace talks in Oslo, Norway, in December 
2002, the LTTE and the Government agreed to establish sub-committees149 to 
discuss sensitive issues such as identifying humanitarian and reconstruction 
needs in the Northeast and organizing the resettlement of refugees and 
internal displaced persons (IDPs), and discussing the question of the regime 
of the High Security Zones. It shows that both sides are aware of the 
importance of these issues and will not jump into any hasty conclusions. 
Controlling humanitarian and reconstruction aid and allocating the financial 
resources in the region is a good starting point for controlling the whole 
economy of the region. Being able to control business and the economic 
environment represents an important step towards actual independence for 
the Tamils. Hence they value pursuing their own economic policy in the 
Northeast slightly more than Sinhalese value keeping the control over the 
economy in the Northeast. The Government took an important step towards 
the Tamils by agreeing on having the Tamil non-govemmental organizations, 
such as the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a significant participant 
in organizing on the rehabilitation in the Northeast150. By passing the 
responsibility on the Tamil organization, the Government shows willingness to 
share decision-making power in this area. On the other hand, the Sinhalese 
are still keen on this item since they know that the Tamil, in becoming fully
resources from these funds. All three main ethnic groups were represented in the sub-committee. Establishing 
such a decision-making body is a fair, yet not permanent solution. The Sri Lanka Peace Support Conference of 
Donors was held in Oslo on November 25, 2002. During the conference all three main Sri Lankan communities, 
Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims addressed donor countries and reassured them about the stability of the Sri 
Lankan peace process. 39 donor countries were represented at the conference.
149 Four Tamils, four representatives of the Government, and a Muslim representative will be in every sub- 
committee. Source: Transcript of the Press Conference after the Oslo session in December 2002, published on 
the official website of GOSL (www.priu.gov.lk) on December 5, 2002.
150 Both Anton Balasingham, chief negotiator for LTTE, and G. L. Peiris, the head of the Government 
negotiating team, confirmed that the Tamil organizations would be included in implementing development 
projects in the Northeast. Source: Transcript of the press conference after the third session of the first round of 
the peace talks in Oslo; answers to a question of the BBC reportér Frances Harrison.
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economically independent, can profit from their eminent relations with India 
and overtake the Government in this matter. Nonetheless, the Government is 
aware of the fact that it has to abandon some portion of economic control to 
the Northeast region. Secondly, the donor countries contribute to the funds on 
condition that the LTTE and the Government observe the Ceasefire 
agreement and adhere to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The 
Governmenťs priority is to meet the expectation. It is easier for the 
Government to tolerate the already de facto existing economy in the Northeast 
than to lose its reliability in front of the donor countries. Currently the LTTE 
imposes additional local taxation on the population in the Northeast. They 
virtually administer an independent economy. It is immensely important for 
them to legalize their current status and to gain direct access to assets from 
the Worlďs Bank fund the North-East Rehabilitation Fund (NERF) that is 
financed with contributions from donor countries. The question of whether the 
return of refugees and IDPs is conditioned by the reconstruction of the 
Northeast it has to be included in this item151. The LTTE values this item with 
10 points and the Government values it with 8 points.
7.2.6
6. Control over the shores in the Northeast
This is a sensitive issue. Winning this item means being in control of the 
shores in the Northeast. The Government is keen on keeping eminent control 
of all shores of the island. It believes in only one army and thus one navy. 
Secondly, the Government argues152 that it would not be beneficial and 
practical for the security of the country as a whole if the control of its shores 
was divided between two subjects. The Government sees this item as its vital 
function and is not willing to subside. Contrarily LTTE has its own navy unit, 
the Sea Tigers, and wants to control the shores in the Northeast. Many Tamils
1,1 The refugee question is being further discussed as an independent item. However for the purposes of the 
Adjusted Winner application it cannot exist as a separate item.
152 Lakshman Kadirgamar, the long time advisor to President Karamatunga, mentions this perspective in several 
of his speeches. Despite the fact that the UNP does not necessarily share this exact opinion it has to be accounted 
for in the AW analysis. It was already mentioned that the Government is viewed as a sole player and all the 
elements of the executive power háve to be incorporated (included) in the analysis. The speeches of Kadirgamar 
were published on the Governmenťs official website (www.priu.gov.lk ).
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are making their living as fishermen and therefore are immensely interested in 
keeping the shores in the Northeast to the Tamil. In čase the Government 
regains complete control of the Northeast shores, the fishermerVs conditions 
would not necessary change. On the other hand, the LTTE presents this item 
as the fundamental issue for the common Tamil fishermen living in the area.
7.2.6.1
Conditions underthe Ceasefire agreement
The conditions of the shores regime were negotiated in both the 
Ceasefire agreement in February 2002 and in the speciál agreement 
modifying conditions of the LTTE sea movement on August 13, 2002153. Both 
sides agreed to end any military operations including offensive naval 
operations; the LTTE assented to disarmament of their paramilitary group on 
the sea, and to notify the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) of any kind of 
the Tamil movement on the sea (such as sea transport, transport of the LTTE 
cadres, etc.). The Tamil do not respect the settled conditions, as they violated 
them several times. The Delft Island incident154 from February 7, 2003, was 
one of the main examples of the Tamil non-adherence to the existing 
agreements. In another incident from March 11, 2003 the Sri Lankan Navy 
(SLN) caught the LTTE vessel sailing without any flag carrying warlike 
materiál. Those incidents indicate that this issue is very sensitive. Both sides 
express their willingness to control the Northeast shores. It is a vital security 
interest of both the Government and the LTTE. The incidents on the sea with
15j The Agreement modifying conditions of the LTTE sea movement immensely tied the Tamil operations on the 
sea. The LTTE ships were obligated to report the purpose of movement; point of origin with estimated 
department, and destination with estimated time of arrival; routě; type of vessel; number of LTTE cadres being 
transported; method of communication with the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) and the Sri Lankan Monitoring 
Missions (SLMM); and number of permanent crew members. Such regulations do not allow the LTTE to 
practice full control over the shores in the Northeast.
154 “Around mid aftemoon yesterday the Sri Lanka Navy had intercepted an Indian-registered trawler manned 
by three LTTE cadres. The occupants had threatened to commit suicide i f  apprehended. The Navy then contacted 
the SLMM. The Nordic monitors inspected the craft confirmed the presence o f weapons. The three LTTE men 
then went on to set fire to the boat forcing the monitors to jump to their safety. The SLMM spokesman said the 
Monitors found a 23-milimetre anti-aircraft gun, anti-aircraft ammunition and three hand grenades in the boat. 
The incident occurred a few  hours before the fifth session o f peace talks were to begin in Berlin. ” Source: Press 
release based on the detailed report of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) on the GOSL offícial 
website from February 7, 2003. It is believed that the weapons were being smuggled by the Tamil hence they 
were violating the ceasefire agreement.
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the Tamil Sea Tigers155 were some of the reasons causing denouncement of 
the Ceasefire agreement by the LTTE side in April 2003.
7.2.6.2
Port Trincomalee
Further, problems lie around the utilization of the Trincomalee harbor 
which, thanks to its great strategie location, has a great military potential. The 
Government is keen on using the harbor as a naval base, alternatively offering 
it to its allies, the United States which has eminent interest in building a naval 
base there. The LTTE’s leadership is generally anti American and it strictly 
opposes the idea of the US naval base in the Northeast. For the Government, 
losing this item would represent threat to the unity and the security of the 
island, however their perception of this item is not the same as that of the 
LTTE. According to Filipsky, the Tamil identify the shores of the Northeast with 
eelam, their homeland. Only the possibility of the US naval base on the soil of 
the eelam forces them to assign more points than the Government -  8 points. 
The GOSL allocates 6 points to this item.
7.2.7
7. Participation of the Muslims in the neqotiations
The Tamils welcome Muslim involvement in the peace negations, 
however they do not see the Muslims as the third party. Gajendrakumar 
Ponnambalam, Member of Parliament for the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
explained this notion in his speech at a seminář organized by the National 
Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace & Human Development: “...there is 
one position taken by some Muslim political leaders that we háve difficulty 
with, and this is with regard to the insistence of "Third Party" status. The 
Muslim people must understand that the underlying dynamics that is 
sustaining the present process is the Military parity that was created on the
155 The Sea Tigers are a unit under LTTE leadership. It caused several incidents during the validity of the 
Ceasefire agreement. The Sea Tigers were caught several times smuggling arms on their vessel and above all did 
not cooperate with the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
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ground. It is this military parity that has transiated itself in to the political parity 
that is evident at the negotiating table. The parity therefore, is crucial if the 
peace process is to be sustained. The LTTE and the Tamil people are 
extremely sensitive to this fact, and cannot allow this balance to be t/pseř.” 156 
However, the Muslims are not given regular party status. Their participation in 
negotiations is preferable for Tamils since they share the same goal -  
devolution of center political power. The Tamils even included the Muslim 
community in the proposed agreement on Interim Self-Governing Authority 
(ISGA). This issue is certainly not the most significant one in the negotiations, 
and both parties are likely to agree on the Muslims taking an active role 
(without third party status). The GOSL is not against Muslim participation, 
however they are less enthusiastic and value it only for 5 points. For GOSL the 
ideál situation would be to fully represent the Muslim community (háve them 
so subjugated that they would trust the GOSL and let them negotiate in their 
name too). During the talks in Thailand (September 16 -  18, 2002, Sattahip) 
the leader of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, Rauff Hakeem, was in the 
government delegation (GOSL official website -  September 4, 2002) and 
above all he was the head of Muslim delegation representing the Muslim 
community. For the GOSL it is more important to be the voice of the Muslim 
community than to háve the Muslims participating in the negotiations. The 
Muslims also háve been opposed to unification of the North and the East into 
the Northeast from 1987. They suffer from the Tamil predominance in the 
Northeast region and often express their concerns about their 
independence157. The LTTE, on the other hand, is keen on incorporating the 
Muslims into the Tamil nation due to their language similarity. The LTTE 
leaders do not want an independent Muslim player since they want to 
represent the Muslim interests. Winning this item would signify that the LTTE 
would speak for the Muslim community living in the East and speaking the 
Tamil language. They assign 3 points to this item. The Sinhalese would prefer 
to háve Muslims on their side rather than them becoming a third party of the 
dispute. President Kumaratunga emphasized longing for the unity of the
156 Transcript of the speech was published on the GOSL official website (www.priu.gov.lk) in April 2002.
157 The Tamil front the eastem part are more open to cooperation with Muslims since they also fear the 
dominance of the LTTE leaders from the North.
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country in her speech addressed to the Muslims during the holý time of the 
Hadj festival158. The Government assigns more points to this item since it the 
Sinhalese want to enhance a competition for the Tamil ambitions. Supposing 
the GOSL would win this item the Muslims would not become fully-fledge third 
party of the negotiations, however their arguments would be taken more 
seriously. The Government allocates 5 points to this item.
7.2.8
8. Organization the resettlement of refuqees
Since the beginning of the conflict nearly one million Tamils159 háve fled 
Sri Lanka and about 800,000 Internal displaced persons (IDPs) were forced to 
move out their homes to the refugee camps in the south of the island. From 
those about 250,00 háve returned home. The refugees háve settled mostly in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, Germany, Switzerland, 
Denmark, and India háve become some of the most significant financial 
contributors of the LTTE. There are not exact numbers but about 80,000 want 
to return to Sri Lanka. Prime minister, Ranil Wickremasinghe, said that the 
Government was prepared to create a safe environment for return but would 
leave the decision to return up to the refugees160. Creating the safe living 
environment has two levels -  economical (financing reconstruction of the 
Northeast) and security (settling the discussion around the High Security 
Zones Regime - HSZ). The LTTE conditions the resettlement of refugees and 
IDPs by the removal of the HSZ regime around some strategie points at the 
Jaffna peninsula. The Tamil argue that the presence of the Sri Lankan army is 
disabling safe return of the refugees and IPDs. The Government is not willing
158 The Hajd festival is the traditional Muslim pilgrimage to the holý cities of Mecca and Media. President 
Chandrika Kamaratunga expressed her wishes for harmony among all nations living in Sri Lanka: It is certain 
that our pilgrims will pray for peace and harmony in Sri Lanka andfor the prosperity o f our motherland, so that 
no one needs to harm another to establish class or racial differences and that all can live happily in equality as 
citizens o fSriLanka”, GOSL official website (www.priu.gov.lk), February 23, 2002.
159 The number is from a UNHCR survey ffom server www.srilankatamil.net according to the Tamils Refugees 
and IDPs started retuming to their homes in the North and the East when the situation calmed down after the 
signing of the Ceasefire agreement. UNHCR stated that only in 2002, more than quarter of million civilians 
returned home. (Source: Wilkinson, R. (2003): After the decades of war, Sri Lanka is on the mend: Refugees, 
No. 130/2003, UNHCR Media and Public Information Service, Milan.
160 “The Government will continue with its initiatives in respect o f  resettlement o f  displaced persons.” Ranil 
Wickremasinghe addressed a speciál session at the Japanese Center for Conflict Prevention in Tokyo on 
December 4, 2002. The official Govemmenťs website (www.priu.gov.lk) published the speech.
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to negotiate this matter. Both sides showed willingness to solved the economic 
aspects of problém by including this issue in the agenda of the sub- 
committees created at the meeting in Oslo in December 2002. One of the 
main aims of the sub-committees was to attract foreign donors and ultimately 
to guarantee them that the funds will be ušed for humanitarian purposes. The 
question, which remains, is how the funds will be redistributed and who be will 
in control of them. The Government has agreed to let the Tamil organizations 
to participate in guiding the direction of the sub-committees. For the LTTE 
having the Tamil organizations participate in restoration of the country is yet 
another step in becoming an equal political player to the Government.
However relevant this question is to the analysis of the conflict in Sri 
Lanka, concluding all the aspects of this item it is evident that it cannot be fully 
separated from the item of the Level of political autonomy (the Tamil condition 
return of refugees and IDPs by removal of the High Security Zones) and from 
the item of Distribution of funds in the Northeast (funding the return of the 
refugees to the Northeast appeared on the agenda of the subcommittees 
dealing with the economic reconstruction of the island). Due to this the item 
Organization the resettlement of refugees cannot be part of the Adjusted 
Winner proceduře. Hence the condition of the removal of the High Security 
Zones would be part of the Level of political autonomy item and the question 
of the return of the refugees will be part of the item dealing with Distribution of 
funds in the Northeast.
7.2.9
9. Religion (or non-religion) of the statě
The conflict between the Tamil and the Sinhalese is not mainly based 
on religion. Nevertheless, the question of religion played an important role in 
1950s when the Buddhist monks lounged the “Sinhala only” campaign. 
Buddhism was until 1972 the statě religion. After the constitutional changes in 
May, 1972 it lost its statě status. Nevertheless the Sri Lankan constitution 
declares Buddhism the statě support. The Sinhalese feel the need to protéct 
the purity of the Buddhist religion from the Hindu regional predominance. Sri
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Lankan Buddhism is unique (the only of its kind in the whole world). Sinhalese 
nationalists base their national identity on the religion and by protecting the 
exclusive role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka they protéct their own identity. On the 
other hand, the Tamil national struggle is not based solely on the religion. The 
LTTE ideology refers its national struggle to many sources such as Lenin’s 
and Trotsky’s nation right to self-determination, the UN Charter and the right to 
self-determination and internal self-determination, and other theories 
defending a natioďs right to its homeland. They are Hindu, however the 
religion is not their only Identification. Secondly, there is 80,5% Hindu in 
neighboring India which puts them in a different perspective than Sinhalese161. 
As mentioned earlier, religion is definitely not the key item in the dispute. For 
the Tamil, winning this item would mean a having better chance resisting 
Buddhist influence. For the Sinhalese winning this item would imply a higher 
possibility of keeping a partial Buddhist influence in the Tamil inhabited areas. 
The Sinhalese are committed to protecting Buddhism in Sri Lanka. The 
Government values this item for 13 points. Since Hindu is not the only Tamil 
attribute they assign less, only 3 points to this item.
7.2.10
10. Management of the water resources in the Northeast
This is a minor issue and definitely does not represent the core item in 
the debate. However it represents a matter in the dispute, which is to be 
divided between the two parties under the Adjusted Winner proceduře. The 
areas in the north and the east háve always been affected by drought and the 
only alternativě water resource; the Monsoon rains háve not been sufficient 
enough. After gaining the independence from the British in 1948, the 
Government launched several projects to establish reservoirs for growing 
grain. The originál project was to háve an agriculture base in the Northeast 
and to provide the new agriculture land to Sinhalese landless persons. The 
reservoirs are now on Tamil claimed territory. The LTTE considers the water 
reservoirs as part of their homeland and desire to be fully in control of the
161 Source: Data based on the census in India from 2001, www.censusindia.net.
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waterworks on the Mahaweli Ganga River. On the other hand, the Sinhalese 
proclaimed the water reservoirs to be for all the citizens of Sri Lanka. In their 
opinion the Government is entitled to manage them. Nonetheless, the 
Government position on this item is not very firm. The Tamil see this item as 
something involving their homeland and hence assigning more, 3 points, while 
the Government assigns only 2 points.
7.3 Point Allocation
One item has proved to be inseparable from another hence it cannot be ušed 
for the AW calculation. The other items are evaluated by the players and a certain 
value is assigned to each item. The values of each item were assigned after deep 
discussion of the topič with two admired experts on the conflict in Sri Lanka, Jan 
Filipsky and Radek Novotný. Each side temporally wins the item to which it placed 
more points.
The author asked both Filipsky (F) and Novotný (N) to divide the items into 
three categories based (primary items, secondary items, marginal items) on their 
importance to the Tamil and the Sinhalese. Additionally, the experts stated which 
items would be preferable to either side. According to this evaluation and after careful 
study of the available statements of the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE, and 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the author assign points for the AW application.
Primary Items F N
Level of political autonomy GOSL GOSL/LTTE
Control of Jaffna and the 
Elephant Pass GOSL/LTTE LTTE
Institutions for administration of 
justice LTTE LTTE
Disarmament of LTTE GOSL/LTTE GOSL
Secondary Items F N
Distribution of funds in the 
Northeast LTTE GOSL/LTTE




Marginal Items F N
Participation of the Muslims in 
the negotiations GOSL GOSL
Management of Water 
Resources LTTE LTTE




7.3.1 Hypothetical GOSL and LTTE’s input preferences
Item GOSL LTTE
Level of political autonomy 30 25
Control of Jaffna and the 
Elephant Pass 8 20
Administration of Institutions for 
administration of justice 14 18
Disarmament of LTTE 14 10
Distribution of funds in the 
Northeast 8 10
Control of the shores in the 
Northeast 6 8
Participation of the Muslims in 
the negotiations 5 3
Management of Water 
Resources 2 3
Religion or (non-religion) in the 
Northeast 13 3
Initial point total 100 100
7.3.2 Initial allocation
Item GOSL LTTE
Level of political autonomy 30 0
Control of Jaffna and the 
Elephant Pass 0 20
Administration of Institutions for 
administration of justice 0 18
Disarmament of LTTE 14 0
Distribution of funds in the 
Northeast 0 10
Control of the shores in the 
Northeast 0 8
Participation of the Muslims in 
the negotiations 5 0
Management of Water 
Resources 0 3
Religion or (non-religion) in the 
Northeast 13 0
Initial point total 62 59
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7.3.3 Calculated point allocation
The Governmenťs initial point total (62) is greater than that of the LTTE (59). 
In order to achieve equitability some points must be thus transferred from the GOSL 
to the LTTE. Comparing the items by their ratios GOSL/LTTE, the item Level of 
political autonomy has the smallest ration (30/25, 1,2). To achieve equability part of 
that item must be transferred to the LTTE. The portion of the item will come from the 
following equation.
62 -  30p = 59 + 25p
p «  0 .05
Item GOSL LTTE
Level of political autonomy 28.36 1.36
Control of Jaffna and the 
Elephant Pass 0 20
Administration of Institutions for 
administration of justice 0 18
Disarmament of LTTE 14 0
Distribution of funds in the 
Northeast 0 10
Control of the shores in the 
Northeast 0 8
Participation of the Muslims in 
the negotiations 5 0
Management of Water 
Resources 0 3
Religion or (non-religion) in the 
Northeast 13 0
Initial point total 60,36 60,36
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8. The results of the Adiusted Winner proceduře
Only the item Level of political autonomy of the dispute is going to be divided 
in between the Government and the LTTE. The LTTE receives about 5% of the value 
which was assigned to it.
Respecting Bram’s thesis that the AW proceduře is applicable to any type of 
conflict the author has some doubts about the efficiency and applicability to the 
conflict in Sri Lanka. During the analysis under the AW proceduře the following 
quandaries háve occurred:
• Troubles while assigning the points due to the disunity of the players.
• Complexity of the items of the conflict.
• Lengthy decision-making process -  it took too long (in same cases about a 
year when the players were sizing up their attitude towards some questions of 
the conflict)
8.1 Troubles while assiqn the points due to the disunity of the players
Although it has been stated that for the purposes of the AW application that 
both parties -  the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
will be perceived as two monolithic entities. In some cases it has been nearly 
unmanageable to see two groups instead of a larger cluster of various factors. The 
Government side is represented by the United National Party whose peace efforts 
such as signing the Memorandum of Understanding were often undermined by the 
opposition parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and JVP. Since these three parties 
háve diametrically opposed goals in resolving the conflict, all their positions should be 
taken into consideration while assigning the points of input preferences. The author 
took into account every possible aspect of the various positions, consulted with 
experts on the region, but nevertheless allocating some points was immensely 
complicated and the results should not be regarded as an exact outcome. The 
situation might háve been different if the author could discuss the point allocation 
directly with the Government and the Tamil representatives. However, even in such
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čase the division of the players into different fractions162 would prevent an absolute 
success of the AW application. Bram’s and Taylor refer to the Adjusted Winner 
proceduře as to the finál solution while the parties are meant to be satisfied with the 
results (as they received item they preferred -  valued the most). Yet, when the 
players are divided into various fractions and their point allocation is very likely to be 
undermined from the inside, it is nearly impossible to assign exact values to the 
chosen items.
8.2 Complexitv of the items of the conflict
Some of the chosen issues of the conflict in Sri Lanka are very complex, 
embracing various smáli facets. While it is infeasible within the framework of the 
Master thesis to divide the items into more detailed ones and that simplification may 
affect the outcome of the analysis. Given more research opportunities (preferably in 
Sri Lanka) it may be possible to make a more thorough analysis.
8.3 Lenqthv decision-makinq process
The other possible effect on the application of the Adjusted Winner to the 
conflict in Sri Lanka is the fact that the positions of the players regarding some key 
items (such as the question of the federal structure, joint control of the assets from 
the donor fund, the question of the LTTE cadres disarmament) háve developed over 
a long period of time. If the AW proceduře was to be applied to the Sri Lankan conflict 
in reality, it may be difficult since some preferences of the Government and the LTTE 
may háve changed over the course of the negotiations. During the peace process 
(facilitated by the Norwegian government) both players (and the Government 
especially) háve changed their perspectives on some items. Over the six meetings 
between the Sinhalese and the Tamil both sides improved their communication and 
clarified their stances on certain issues163. The results of the AW application may be 
doubted because of this development in the peace talks. The AW results would differ
162 The official LTTE representation headed by Prabhakaran has opponents among its own people, especially in 
the East. Nevertheless, besides the intemal LTTE opposition, there are many other Tamil organizations who do 
not perceive resolving the conflict in the same way as the LTTE.
163 The cooperation proved to be successful in practical cases such as the creation of the sub-committees dealing 




if the proceduře was applied immediately after the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding in February, 2002 or after the Oslo meeting164.
9. Conclusion
In this thesis project the author claimed the aim of finding new strategies for 
mediating ethnic and religious conflicts. After gaining better knowledge of the different 
aspects of mediation in various fields (divorce, labor dispute settlements, business 
negotiations) it became clear that for the purposes of the Master’s thesis it is possible 
to apply no more than one proceduře. The author chose Adjusted Winner for its 
novelty (the proceduře has never been applied to any political conflict in reál 
negotiations and rather few political scientists háve carried out a theoretical simulation 
of the AW application). Secondly, the author’s discussions with Steven Brams gave a 
better understanding of the field of fair division. The possibility to discuss the aims of 
this work, the AW application to the conflict in Sri Lanka with the inventor of Adjusted 
Winner was yet another factor that led this thesis in such a direction. The author 
stayed true to the initial aims described in the project -  to find new procedures ušed in 
mediating of the divorce, labor, and business negotiations applicable to political 
conflicts. The originál project has been modified and narrowed to just one čase study 
(Sri Lanka) and one proceduře (Adjusted Winner)165. At the end of the work, it is 
evident that such limitation was very useful for the work. It allowed the author to 
explain the AW in greater detail and elucidate the roots of the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
The mediations attempts by India, Norway, and Japan were described for their 
relevance to the work and later in the conclusion compared to the results of the AW 
application.
164 The Oslo round of the peace talks in December 2002 was one of the most successful rounds. Prior to the 
meeting, the conference of donor countries was held in November 2002. The interest in the process of 
reconstruction of the Northeast showed the good faith of the donor countries in the peace negotiations in Sri 
Lanka.
165 The Czech request for the project modification and change of the title fřom Aspects of Mediation in Ethnic 
and Religious Conflicts: Potential for employing new strategies to Mediation in Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: 
Applying the Adjusted Winner Proceduře.
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9.1 Availabilitv of information to assiqninq value to the items of the dispute
The author was aware of the fact that the information concerning the positions 
of the parties was not completely available. One of the questions of this work was 
whether it is possible to successfully simulate the AW application depending only on 
the experts on the region assigning values to the items. After the application it 
seems obvious that direct talks with the representatives of the disputants are 
necessary for a successful AW application. Both experts, Filipsky and Novotný, are 
the best specialists on Sri Lanka in the Czech Republic. However, their perception of 
the values of the items of the conflict differed in some cases166. On the other hand it 
has to be noted that they do not háve any deeper knowledge of the field of fair 
division and had a hard time seeing the conflict on a theoretical level, unaffected by 
cultural perception of the region (i.e. It was hard for them to imagine such application 
actually taking plače in peace negotiations between the Government and the LTTE.).
In author’s opinion the finál results of the Adjusted Winner application would 
differ from the ones presented in this work if the actual actors in the conflict assigned 
the values. The situation may be different if the conflict was already terminated and 
the author was able to gain more information on parties’ positions regarding various 
items. The problém with ongoing conflict is that neither side is willing to share its 
preferences for the purposes of an academie research. The author contacted both 
the Government and the LTTE several times, but their replies were always negative. 
The Norwegian mediator was reluctant in sharing information on the Sinhalese and 
the Tamil positions towards the discussed items. Secondly, as it was apparent from 
the six sessions of the peace talks the parties approach on some issues changed 
over the course of the negotiations. At this point it is appropriate to express 
skepticism in applying the Adjusted Winner proceduře to ongoing conflicts. The 
outcome is likely to be very exact but without direct talks to the actors it is impossible 
to prove the exact point allocation which is crucial for the whole application. On the
166 They agreed on division of the items into three groups (centrál items, secondary items, and marginal items) 
however in the čase of Control o f the shores in the Northeast item their opinion on who whose desire to win the 
item would be stronger varied. In the čase of items Level o f political autonomy, Control o f Jaffna and Elephant 
pass, Disarmament o f the LTTE, and Distribution offunds in the Northeast) their answers were not identical 
(Filipsky assign the same values to Control o f Jaffna and Elephant pass and to Disarmament o f the LTTE and 
Novotný to Level o f political autonomy and Distribution o f  funds in the Northeast).
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other hand while applying the AW to terminated historical conflicts there should be 
sufficient amount of evidence available for the point allocation.
9.2 Disunitv of the plavers
The author mentioned the division among different fractions within the Tamil 
and the Sinhalese group. Yet again, it has to be pointed out that the disunity of the 
players may negatively affect the outcome of the analysis. The creators of the theory, 
Steven Brams and Alan Taylor, assume that the parties are capable of assigning 
value to the items according to their true preferences. Brams and Taylor even 
continue in the discussion by addressing situations when the actors try to guess each 
others preferences. The problém however lies in the disunity of the actors. The Tamil 
and the Sinhalese community were perceived as monolithic players for the purposes 
of this work. Nevertheless it has to be taken into consideration that such thing is in the 
reality impossible. The lack of unanimity is evident when studying the history of the 
peace process or the Norwegian mediation attempts. The Sinhalese parties are 
interdependent (since 1994 the Government is always composed of a coalition) and 
cannot reach consensus regarding the LTTE and the peace process. The United 
National Party (UNP) is generally more open to the concessions towards the Tamil but 
its action were limited (when in power after the generál elections in 2001) by the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and JVP opposition. The last SLFP Government formed 
a coalition with JVP which is categorically against any compromises with the Tamil 
claims. The Tamil division is seemingly less evident since the LTTE adheres to non- 
democratic practices and does not tolerate any kind of opposition. Nevertheless the 
Tamil are still divided. Ethnically, the Sri Lankan Tamil feel superior to the Indián Tamil 
who came in the 19th century to work on the British tea plantations. Politically, there 
are Tamil parties who are represented in the Sri Lankan Parliament (Tamil National 
Alliance, TNA and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front, ENDLF) and other 
Tamil groups (i.e. the Eelam People’s Democratic Party, EPDP) who are opposed to 
the Prabhakaran’s totalitarian governance. Respecting the existing division within the 
Sinhalese and the Tamil group the Adjusted Winner application to the conflict in Sri 
Lanka seems very surreal. Generally, it appears very complicated to apply the 
proceduře to a conflict where diverse fractions exist within each player. Under such
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conditions opposition groups can always doubt the results, hence the resolution would 
not be definitivě.
The effect of the disunity may be reduced over a certain period of time. The 
peace negotiations facilitated by the Norwegians proved that disputants tend to be 
willing to compromise after gaining more confidence in the other side. In Sri Lanka 
some issues which were unacceptable at the beginning were being admitted. 
Supposing the AW application was accepted in reality and lasted the traditional one 
session the parties may háve some difficulties dealing with the issues.
On the other hand if a mediator assisted in selecting the items and assigning 
values the period of his/her help during the first session of the official negotiation could 
be ušed for the actual AW application. Nevertheless, Brams and Taylor refer to 
Adjusted Winner as to non time-consuming method. The AW proceduře presumes that 
the point allocation and the whole application would be doně within one series of talks. 
Brams and Taylor do not talk explicitly about the time period necessary for the AW 
application however it is evident from the ušed examples that this time period would 
not be essentially a long, continually developing process. The talks for assigning 
values could last an indefinite period of time (mediation facilitated by Norway proved 
that) which would defend the non lengthy goal. Studying the development of the peace 
process in Sri Lanka it is clear that the relationship between the two parties develops 
and in the same way their approach towards each item develops. If the AW proceduře 
was applied it would not develop the same way -  both parties would miss that period 
to rethink their approaches.
9.3 Applyinq the Adjusted Winner proceduře to the conflict in Sri Lanka
The AW method is a universal proceduře which can be applied to a conflict of 
any nátuře. The only question remains whether the application is successful and has 
the potential of satisfying both parties so that they would not look for an alternativě 
solution and terminate the dispute. In the Sri Lankan čase the author sees two major 
problems with the AW application -  not enough information on the Sinhalese and 
Tamil preferences (mostly because the conflict is still ongoing) and disunity with the 
Sinhalese and the Tamil groups. The other problém is perception of the third party
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(mediator) in Sri Lanka. Supposing the AW method was employed in reality -  only a 
strong (not strong in the sense of international influence, but strong in terms of their 
perception by the disputants) mediator would be able to enforce the AW usage and 
adherence of the results. Seeing the conflict from the political perspective (non 
economic), Norway has been the most successful mediator. The biggest 
achievement under the Norwegian assistance has been the Memorandum of 
Understanding (which was still severely criticized by the Government opposition Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party, SLFP). With all the respects to the Norwegian government 
and their efforts in the Sri Lankan matter, the author cannot possibly see willingness 
of applying such novelty method in the mediation as the Adjusted Winner proceduře.
Not even the best proceduře can guarantee success. If the both sides are not 
determined to follow the results of the peace talks and enforce its implementations 
nothing else can be doně to create peace. The problém of the peace negotiations in 
Sri Lanka is that both the LTTE and the Government are not fully committed to 
compromise on their statues.
It would be interesting to see the results of the AW application if both parties 
were willing to allocate their points themselves. The items of the conflict are certain to 
remain the same unlike the assigned values. With all the respect to the experts 
assisting the author with the point distribution for the purposes of this work, the AW 
application can be easily challenged for lacking relevance due to the dearth of 
information on the Sinhalese and the Tamil positions. The point allocation would not 
greatly differ, however it would be interesting how the finál calculated allocation 
would differ if the values changed.
9.4 General hypothesis about applying the Adjusted Winner proceduře to political 
conflict
Every political conflict is unique and has different roots and characteristics. It is 
difficult to make a generál statement concerning the AW employment to a political 
conflict. Based on the experience with the AW application to the conflict in Sri Lanka 
the author finds four key elements to a successful mediation using the AW method.
(1) There are not any significant opposition fractions within the different actors.
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(2) Both parties are willing to enter mediation under the AW proceduře.
(3) The mediator is strong enough to ensure that the parties are open about 
their preferences and assign true values to the selected items.
(4) The parties are prepared to accept the results of the AW proceduře and not 
to change their preferences over a certain period of time -  willing to 
compromise and are more keen on terminating the conflict than keeping 
the status quo, a damaging stalemate.
9.5 Comparison of the mediation doně bv Norwav and the results of the Adiusted 
Winner application
As mentioned earlier, the mediation under Norwegian assistance met the 
highest accomplishment -  stopping the open fighting between the LTTE cadres and 
the Government forces and facilitating the six rounds of peace negotiations (from 
September 2002 to April 2003)167 thus the results of the Norwegian mediation will be 
compared to the results of the Adjusted Winner application.
9.5.1 Primarv items
The AW outcome says that the Level of political autonomy will 95% remain in 
the hands of the Government. It means that the Tamil political representation will not 
be on the same level as the centrál Colombo government. The LTTE has accepted 
throughout the negotiations that they will not secede from the Sri Lanka country and 
will seek a solution within the framework of one country. In author’s opinion the 
outcome of the AW application would not be satisfactory for the Tamil. The peace 
talks (September 2002 -  April 2003) proved that the LTTE was not willing to make 
any major concessions regarding this issue. The results of the other primary issues, 
which were given to the LTTE - Control of Jaffna and the Elephant Pass and 
Administration of Institutions for administration of justice, were according to the peace 
talks tolerated by the Government to be in hands of the Tamil. The Government still 
values both items, however, and it is evident that the Control of Jaffna and the 
Elephant Pass item was not their key interest and the Government wanted only to
167 The Japanese mediation efforts met with success as well (addressing donor countries, collecting funds), 
however the Japanese involvement remained only on the economical and sociál level without any immense 
influence on the political negotiations.
85
Martina Klimešová
ensure the peace and stability in the region before handing it to the Tamil. The item, 
Administration of Institutions for administration of justice, attracts more interest of the 
Government, but the current status quo in the Tamil controlled territory disables the 
Sinhalese from regaining control over the institutions of justice in the Northeast. The 
results of the actual peace talks would not be as specific (everything goes to the 
LTTE) as the results of AW, however the de facto situation would remain the same. 
The primary item given fully to the Government, Disarmament of LTTE, does not 
háve the similar outcome in the peace talks facilitated by the Norwegian government. 
Despite the fact that the both sides assign similar value to the item (GOSL 14, LTTE 
10) the Government wins the whole item. It is very evident from the peace talks that 
such result would not be possible if under regular peace negotiations. Even though 
the LTTE committed to disarmament of its cadres in the Ceasefire agreement it 
refused to do so unless the conflict is solved and the Tamil community is not 
endangered by the Sinhalese interests.
9.5.2 Secondarv items
Both secondary items, Distribution offunds in the Northeast and Control of the 
shores in the Northeast are won by the LTTE. Nonetheless, the actual peace talks do 
not present such a simple outcome. Both Government and the LTTE agreed in Oslo 
(December 2002) to share the distribution of funds from the donor countries (they 
established sub-committee overseeing distribution of assets from the fund). The item 
Control of the shores in the Northeast is more complicated but with regards to the 
peace talks it cannot be simply given to one side. The outcome of the AW proceduře 
may vary if the author knew the actual preferences of the GOSL and the LTTE, 
however even despite the fact that the both players assigned very similar values to 
the item (GOSL 6, LTTE 8) the item was fully given to one side. However, at this 
point the result of the AW application is very different from the actual outcome of the 
peace negotiations.
9.5.3 Marqinal items
The marginal items were not greatly discussed in the peace negotiations, so it 
is hard to compare the outcome of the AW proceduře with the outcome of the
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negotiations. The issues are not core items but represent soft issues which are part of 
the dispute. The Government won items Participation of the Muslims in the 
negotiations and Religion or (non-religion) in the Northeast to which the Sinhalese 
often referred when justifying their other claims. The LTTE won the item Management 
of Water Resources which it claimed in the Interim Self-Governing, nevertheless, the 
item was not part of any exclusive talks.
Applying the Adjusted Winner proceduře has been an interesting challenge. 
The outcome, unfortunately, does not represent any breaking point in resolving the 
political situation in Sri Lanka. Secondly, the chance of applying the AW method to 
the conflict in Sri Lanka is very marginal. Nevertheless, the author believes in finding 
new mediation strategies in areas outside the field of politics and this work represents 
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České resumé -  Mediace etnického konfliktu na Srí Laňce: aplikace metody Adiusted 
Winner
Autorka si v projektu diplomové práce klade cíl nalézt nové přístupy pro řešení 
politických konfliktů mezi postupy používanými pro mediaci (mediation, 
zprostředkování řešení) v oblastech, které s politikou nesouvisejí (rozvodová řízení, 
pracovní a obchodní spory). Při studiu mediačních praktik pro tento typ konfliktů se 
seznámila s metodou Adjusted Winner168 (AW) politologa Stevena Bramse z New 
York University a matematika Alana Taylora z Union College. Oba deklarují AW jako 
univerzální metodu vhodnou pro řešení jakéhokoliv sporu. Jedná se o teorii z oblasti 
fair division (spravedlivé dělení), kde hlavní premisou spočívá v tom, že všechny 
body sporu jsou rozdělitelné.
Adiusted Winner
Při použití metody AW obě strany sporu (AW jde teoreticky použít i při řešení 
konfliktu tří stran, metoda ovšem ztrácí jednu ze svých výhod -  metoda již není envy- 
free tj. není možné stejnoměrně uspokojit tři hráče) určí klíčová témata (items) 
konfliktu. Mezi tyto body potom strany rozdělují 100 bodů (nebo kterýkoli jiný 
rovnoměrný počet bodů) podle svých preferencí (tj. čím větší zájem má strana o 
danou položku, tím větší hodnotu ji připíše). Po připsání preference strana dočasně 
vyhraje téma, kterému připsala více preferencí než její protivník. Po této fázi přichází 
fáze narovnání (adjustment). Téma s nejmenším poměrem (poměr preferencí 
připsaných od hráčů) je rozdělováno mezi obě strany, dokud není dosaženo 
rovnoměrnosti. Pro lepší přiblížení metody AW autorka předkládá řešení 
hypotetického rozvodového řízení mezi Georgem a Christinou za použití této metody. 
Přitom se věnuje i případům (např. pokud obě strany připíšou tentýž počet bodů 
stejnému tématu či pokud je jedna strana oprávněna k většímu podílu na vyrovnání), 
které nenastanou při aplikaci AW na konflikt na Srí Laňce, ale jsou relevantní 
k pochopení této teorie V případě, že většina témat je abstraktní povahy, je vhodné 
se před použitím AW metody dohodnout, co bude zisk jednotlivých témat znamenat.
168 Adjusted Winner znamená upravený (uzpůsobený) vítěz. Pojem dosud nebyl přeložen do českého jazyka. 
Autorka šije vědoma možné lingvistické neobratnosti svého překladu.
94
Martina Klimešová
Pokud se tedy jedné straně podaří získat téma Účast muslimů na jednání, mělo by 
být předem dohodnuto, co to pro ni bude obnášet. Ve fázi ujednávání podmínek, 
vybírání témat a připisování preferencí je žádaná pomoc třetí strany. Prostředník 
může asistovat při dohadování podmínek jednání a stanovit pravidla pro vymezení 
předmětů sporu, jež jsou abstraktní povahy.
Konflikt na Srí Laňce byl vybrán pro účely této práce pro svoji zdánlivou 
jednoduchost (pouze dvě strany sporu -  Sinhálci a Tamilové), nezávislosti na velkých 
konfliktech a rozdělení současného světa (dichotomie -  islámský fundamentalismus 
a Západní svět) a v neposlední straně pro zjevnou ochotu obou stran řešit spor za 
pomoci třetí strany.
Konflikt na Srí Laňce a zprostředkovatelé
Vzájemná nevraživost mezi většinovou sinhálskou populací a tamilskou 
menšinou přerostla v občanskou válku v roce 1983. Eskalace byla výsledkem 
radikalizace tamilského vedení (nejsilnějším se stalo hnutí Tamilských tygrů v čele s 
autoritářským Vellupilaiem Prabhakaranem) a vleklé protitamilské kampaně 
sinhálských nacionalistů (nejvíce se angažovali buddhističtí mniši a přestavitelé 
místních samospráv).
Hned od počátky ostrého konfliktu angažovali tři zprostředkovatelé 
(mediators). Indie (regionální hegemon) se ujala role zprostředkovatele v roce 1985. 
Po selhání diplomatických jednání Indie vyslala mírovou misi (IPKF). Vojenská 
intervence ovšem velmi poškodila její důvěryhodnost jako mediátora. Nejúspěšnější 
třetí stranou bylo bezesporu Norsko169. Bylo povoláno v roce 1998 po ztroskotání 
jednání iniciovaných vládní koalicí People’s Alliance v roce 1995. Norsku se podařilo 
úspěšně navázat kontakty s úzkým vedením Tamilských tygrů (lidé okolo Vellupillaie 
Prabhakarana). Zvláštní zmocněnec Norska, Eric Solheim, byl pro své dobré vztahy
169 Norsko je z hlediska klasifikace mediátora malý stát -  tj. stát, který nemá vlastní globální či regionální 
(regionální ve smyslu místa, kde daný konflikt probíhá) zájmy, ani není výrazně spjat s žádnou ze stran konfliktu 
či nemá zájem využít svoji angažovanost pro získání vlastních zájmů.
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s vůdcem LTTE170 často obviňován ze strany SLFP (Srílanská strana svobody) 
z podjatosti vůči Tamilům. Největším úspěchem norského působení na Srí Laňce 
bylo podepsání příměří, tzv. Smlouvy o porozumění (Momorandum of 
Understanding), v únoru 2002 a zastavení bojů. Aplikace AW je zasazena do tohoto 
období, kdy byly obě strany jednoznačně nejvstřícnější k vzájemným kompromisům. 
Třetím prostředníkem bylo Japonsko (ekonomická velmoc), jehož asistence byla 
omezena na zajištění ekonomické pomoci a angažování se v zajištění obnovy země. 
Japonsko je i za těchto podmínek uváděno jako třetí strana, neboť je nutné 
nezužovat konflikt pouze na politickou rovinu.
Záměry aplikace AW
Autorka si kladla za cíl zjistit, zda metoda Adjusted Winner je použitelná pro 
řešení konfliktu na Srí Laňce, potažmo pro řešení politických sporů obecně. Již na 
počátku analýzy si je vědoma, že vnitřní rozštěpenost obou stran konfliktu, Sinhálců 
a Tamilů, může negativně ovlivnit výsledek. Jedním z cílů této práce je zjistit, do jaké 
míry má tato nesourodost vliv na aplikovatelnost AW teorie. Druhým problémem je 
nedostupnost informací ohledně preferencí jednotlivých stran. Přes veškeré pokusy 
nebylo možné získat vyjádření jak od zástupců Tamilských tygrů, tak od zástupců 
srílanské vlády. Norsko coby zástupce zprostředkovatelů vyhovělo žádosti ohledně 
poskytnutí dokumentů, na druhou stranu ovšem odmítlo poskytnout jakékoli 
informace týkající se preferencí LTTE a vládní strany. Po konzultaci s autorem 
metody, Stevenem Bramsem, se autorka rozhodla požádat experty na Srí Lanku o 
ohodnocení jednotlivých témat171. Již při charakteristice jednotlivých stran konfliktu je 
zřejmé, že tyto dva tábory nejsou monolitní. Pro účely aplikace AW, je LTTE 
(.Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) považováno za reprezentanta zájmů Tamilů. Ve 
skutečnosti ovšem existují opoziční skupiny, které nesouhlasí s Vellupillaiem 
Prabhakaranem a jeho monopolizací reprezentace tamilských zájmů. Shoda 
nepanuje ani v táboře Sinhálců. Pro účely této práce jsou Sinhálci označováni jako 
Vláda. Toto označení má pouze podtrhnout protiváhu LTTE při mírových jednáních.
170 Tamilští tygři za svobodný ílam, Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam, LTTE.
171 Autorka spolupracovala s Janem Filipským z Orientálního ústavu při České akademii věd a s Radkem 
Novotným z Filozofické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze.
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Sinhálská reprezentace sice funguje na demokratických principech, na druhou stranu 
je ale velmi polarizovaná. United National Party (UNP) je nejvstřícnější 
k požadavkům Tamilů. Za jejich vlády byla v únoru 2002 podepsána výše zmíněná 
smlouva o příměří (Memorandum of Understanding), která připravila podmínky pro 
následná mírová jednání. Smlouva byla značně kritizována ze strany Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP, toho času v koalici pod názvem People’s Alliance) a 
jednoznačně odmítána JVP (radikální levice). Postoj vlády k mírovým jednáním je 
přímo závislý na tom, jaká politická strana je u moci, popřípadě kdo s kým tvoří 
koalici. Kontinuitu nezajišťuje ani Chandrika Kamaratunga, která vykonává funkci 
prezidentky od roku 1995, neboť je spjata s SLFP. Přes veškeré pokusy odprostit se 
od nejednotnosti jednotlivých aktérů, byl nesoulad při připisování preferencí 
k jednotlivým tématům evidentní.
Témata (items) konfliktu
Hlavními body konfliktu bylo určeno deset témat (Míra politické autonomie /V  
-  Level of political autonomy, Kontrola Jaffny a Sloní stezky 121 -  Control of Jaffna 
and Elephant Pass, Vykonávání jurisdikce 131 -  Institutions of administration of 
justice, Odzbrojení jednotek LTTE 141 -  Disarmament of the LTTE cadres, 
Rozdělování finančních zdrojů na Severovýchodě17215/ -  Distribution of funds in the 
Northeast, Kontrola pobřeží na Severovýchodě 151 -  Control over the shores in the 
Northeast, Účast muslimů na jednání i l i  -  Participation of the Muslims in the 
negotiations, Organizace návratu uprchlíků i8/ -  Organization the resettlement of 
refugees, Vliv náboženství 19/ -  Religion or {non religion} of the statě, a Správa 
vodních zdrojů /10/ -  Management of water resources in the Northeast). Pro účely 
aplikace se ukázalo být použitelných pouze devět. Téma Organizace návratu 
uprchlíků (8) se prokázalo být neoddělitelné od tématu Distribuce finančních fondů 
na Severovýchodě172 73 (5). Vládní strana plně získala tři témata (Odzbrojení jednotek 
LTTE, Účast muslimů na jednání, a Vliv náboženství), o nejžádanější položku (Míra 
politické autonomie -  obě strany připsaly nejvíce preferencí, Vláda 30 a LTTE 25) se 
strany sice podělí, ale LTTE připadne pouze 5% (1,36) z hodnoty kterou jí připsala.
172 Severovýchodem se rozumí oblast pod správou LTTE.
173 Pro účely AW aplikace je klíčové, aby byla jednotlivá témata sporu naprosto oddělitelná. Výhrajednoho 
tématu nesmí být podmíněna výhrou jiného či naopak.
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Ostatní témata podle AW připadají Tamilům. Srovnáme-li výsledky s mírovými 
rozhovory od podepsání smlouvy o příměří v únoru 2002 do krachu jednání v dubnu 
2003, některé tendence jsou podobné (např. Vláda neustoupila Tamilům v otázkách 
odzbrojení).
Výsledek aplikace AW
Autorka došla k závěru, že aplikace AW na konflikt na Srí Laňce je při 
existenci následujících faktorů těžko schůdná:
• Připisování preferencí k jednotlivým tématům velmi komplikuje 
rozštěpenost stran. V případě Vlády mají některé strany (JVP a UNP) 
diametrálně odlišné názory na postoj k LTTE.
• Výsledek může být zpochybněn na základě nedostatečného podložení 
připsání preferencí oběma stranami (vyjádření LTTE ani vládní strany 
nebylo možné získat), což je do jisté míry způsobeno aktuálním 
pokračováním konfliktu. Aplikace AW je obecně jednodušší, pokud se 
jedná o spor již skončený. V takovém případě je možné srovnat 
výsledky se závěry jednání, získat přesnější informace o preferencích 
stran, a aktéři jsou sdílnější ohledně svých postojů.
• Témata konfliktu na Srí Laňce se ukázala být spletitá, v některých 
případech vzájemně provázaná (Organizace návratu uprchlíků). 
Komplexnost a široké vymezení témat může do jisté míry negativně 
ovlivnit výsledek.
• Vlastní proces vyjednávání byl poměrně dlouhý, Tamilové i Sinhálci byli 
ochotni uchýlit se ke kompromisům a ústupkům až po delší sérii 
vyjednávání. Pokud by byla metoda AW použita ve skutečnosti, delší 
rozhodovací doba by mohla negativně ovlivnit výsledek. Postoj vlády se 
přitom může změnit při každé obměně vládnoucích stran.
Autorka vyvodila čtyři obecné závěry pro aplikaci Adjusted Winner na politické 
konflikty. Užití metody má šanci na úspěch pokud: (1) neexistují žádné výrazné 
opoziční frakce uvnitř jednotlivých stran, (2) obě strany souhlasí s vyřešením konfliktu 
za pomocí AW, (3) mediátor je silný, tj. jeho autorita není zpochybňována a nakonec
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(4) oba hráči jsou rozhodnuti dodržovat výsledky AW. V případě Srí Lanky byl 
mírový proces přerušen pro porušování dohody o příměří radikálními frakcemi 
v táborech obou aktérů (incidenty „Mořských tygrů"174, nacionalistické postoje JVP a 
zpochybňování mírového procesu ze strany SLFP), metoda AW má velmi malou 
šanci na reálné využití v této oblasti. Z teoretického hlediska to byl zajímavý pokus o 
nalezení nového postupu pro řešení konfliktu na Srí Laňce, respektive modelového 
mezinárodně-politického sporu.




Title -  Aspects of Mediation in Ethnic and Religious Conflicts: Potential for employing 
new strategies.
Introduction
After the collapse of the bipolar systém, the number of ethnic and religious 
conflicts increased. The international systém was unable to prevent the outbreak of 
new conflicts. I believe that both theorists (academics) and empiricists (politicians) 
should pay more attention to studying new approaches of accommodative strategies 
in conflict management such as bargaining and mediation.
In my Master thesis, I pian to study that speciál aspect of conflict resolution: 
the art of mediation, with a speciál focus on behaviourist aspects of the process, and 
the availability of approaches from the theory of organisational behaviour. I believe 
that the structure of a statě or an international subsystém can be equated to the 
structure of an organisation or a company. One of the main aims of this project is to 
examine whether knowledge of mediating in this area is applicable in the mediation 
of ethnic and religious conflicts.
For purposes of this work mediation is defined as:
A process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts, 
whereby the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept 
an offer of help from an individua!, group, statě or organization to change, affect or 
influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force, or invoking 
the authority of the law1 5
Speciál attention will be given to studying empirical sources. I pian to contact 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (USA, www.fmcs.gov/internet) to 
collect information on their research and surveys of labor mediation and collective 175
175 Bercovitch,J. The structure and diversity o f mediation in international relations, edited by J.Bercovitch and 
J.Rubin, 1-29. New York:St.Martin’s, 1992.
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bargaining. This knowledge will be compared with the theory of strategies in 
mediation of religious and ethnic conflicts. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and The Office of Secretary General of the United Nations will 
be contacted as well for any documents, which would provide empirical examples to 
support theoretical knowledge about behavior and the characteristics of mediators. 
To demonstrate theoretical approaches and findings I will examine two conflicts -  
religious conflict in Northern Ireland and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. While the main 
focus will remain on mediation; additional information will be included to provide 
sufficient background on different influences in the conflicts. When discussing speciál 
aspects of diverse strategies in mediation, examples of other conflicts can be ušed in 
addition. However, the mediation of conflicts in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka will be 
the main analysis of the theoretical finding.
Since the vast majority of available sources and documents, as well as the 
field terminology, are in English, this project will be written in English. Secondly, I 
wish to continue studying conflict resolution and mediation, and a Master thesis 
written in English would help me to further achieve that goal.
Structure
Brief history and background of mediation of international and ethnic conflict
Mediation Process -  basic framework, structure
Mediator
3.1 Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator-mediators from various conflicts 
(ethnic, religious, labor management).
3.2 Mediator’s Behavior 
Mediation Environment
Examples of mediator’s behavior in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka 
Strategies of Mediation
4.1 Strategies in ethnic and religious conflicts
4.1 Communication-facilitation stratégy
4.2 Procedural stratégy 
Directive stratégy
Strategies for mediating conflict in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka
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4.5 Possibility of ímplying new strategies in mediation of international and ethnical 
and religious conflicts.
5. Outside factors influencing the process of mediation.
6. Characteristics of confiict and its parties and their influence on mediation.
7. Conclusion
Questions
To what extent are strategies from different fields of mediation applicable to other 
fields of mediation?
Is the combination of various techniques effective?
Can strategies from labor mediation and community disputes mediation be employed 
in the mediation of ethnic and religious confiict?
What are the greatest impacts on a positive outcome of mediation?
Primarv sources
COPRI (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute) documents (www.copri.dk)
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service documents
The Institute for International Mediation and Confiict resolution documents
(www.iimcr.org)
OSCE documents
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Věc: Žádost o změnu projektu a názvu diplomové práce
Dovoluji si zažádat o změnu projektu, respektive názvu diplomové práce. 
Ústřední myšlenka diplomové práce je nalézt nové metody zprostředkování 
(mediation) pro řešení konfliktů v oblasti mezinárodních vztahů. Při výzkumu a 
shromažďování informací na toto téma jsem narazila na metodu Adjusted Winner, 
která je v současnosti v praxi převážně používána při řešení rozvodů a obchodních 
sporů. Po bližším seznámení s touto metodou a jejím autorem176 jsem se rozhodla 
použít ji pro účely své diplomové práce. Metoda mě velmi zaujala, a zároveň přesně 
splňovala můj hlavní záměr (tj. nalézt procedury v praxi používané pro řešení jiných 
než politických sporů). Na počátku jsem si ovšem nebyla plně vědoma rozsahu, který 
bude tato analýza vyžadovat. Dnes již vím, že je nereálné v rámci jedné diplomové 
práce aplikovat Adjusted Winner na původně dva plánované konflikty, Srí Lanku a 
Serverní Irsko. Diplomová práce bude obsahovat pouze analýzu etnického konfliktu 
na Srí Laňce s použitím metody Adjusted Winner. S ohledem na tuto skutečnost 
považuji za vhodné změnit název své práce z Aspects of Mediation in Ethnic and 
Religious Conflicts: Potential for employing new strategies na Mediation in Ethnic 
Conflict in Sri Lanka: Applying the Adjusted Winner Proceduře.
Martina Klimešová
176 Metoda Adjusted Winner b> la vynalezena Stevnem Bramsem, profesorem politologiie na New York 
University a matematikem Alanem Taylorem z Union College.
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